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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1:

When it was undisputed that Plaintiff Eagle Mountain City brought suit in

its own name, sought compensation for the actual and very real harm it suffered, and
maintained exclusive control over the litigation, did the district court err when it granted
Defendant Parsons Kinghorn & Harris, P.C.'s ("PKH") motion for summary judgment by
concluding, based merely on agreement recitals, that the City's pre-suit agreement to
share proceeds from any potential recovery from PKH constituted a partial, implied
assignment in violation of Utah's public policies?
Standard of Review: An appeal of a summary judgment decision is considered
"under a de nova standard of review, granting no deference to the district court's
analysis." L.C. Canyon Partners. L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2011 UT 63, ,-i 8, 266 P.3d
797. ''A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference; we review
them for correctness." Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
Whether a party receives something "by assignment ... is a question of law that [the
Utah Supreme Court] review[s] for correctness, incorporating a clearly erroneous
standard of review for ... subsidiary factual determinations." Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT
24, ,-i 38, 44 P.3d 742 (abrogated on other grounds by RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60,
i-135, 96 P.3d 935).
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Preservation: (R. 2724-35 (8/17/2015 Hearing Tr. at 22: 18-33:22), 3426-3451.)
Issue 2:

Did the district court err in depriving the City of the trial counsel of

its choice nearly two years into the litigation by ruling, without any motion to disqualify,
that the City could not use counsel "associated" with a non-party to the litigation, Cedar
Valley Water Company ("Cedar Valley")?

Standard of Review: Appellate review of a district court's findings concerning
the existence of an alleged conflict in a law firm's representation "involve mixed
questions of fact and law which, on review, do not require the deference due to findings
on questions of pure fact." Margulies By and Through Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d
1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). "[T]he proper standard of review of that portion of the trial
court's order which allow[s] [a law firm] to remain as counsel in [a] malpractice action is
the abuse of discretion standard." Id. The Utah Supreme Court, "however, has a special
interest in the administration of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the discretion
granted to the trial court in matters of disqualification is quite limited when there are no
factual disputes." Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 UT 39,
603.

Preservation: (R. 2724 (8/17/2015 Hearing Tr. at 22:5-17), 3428.)

2
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8, 78 P.3d

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 3, 2009, Cedar Valley, represented by Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. ("Snell &
Wilmer"), brought a lawsuit against the City as Cedar Valley Water Company, LLC v.
Eagle Mountain City, et. al, Case No. 090402122 (the "Underlying Lawsuit"). In the
Underlying Lawsuit, Cedar Valley alleged that the City breached a contract known as the
2000 Town Well #1

Capacity Purchase Agreement (the "Capacity Purchase

Agreement"). PKH had served as the City's counsel since before that agreement, advising
the City concerning it and administering it on behalf of the City.
At the trial of the Underlying Lawsuit, Cedar Valley intended to show damages
exceeding $8 million. In the weeks prior to trial, trial counsel for the City, Williams &
Hunt ("WH") advised the City that PKH's advice and administration of the Capacity
Purchase Agreement was likely legal malpractice, and had subjected the City to millions
of dollars in liability. Shortly before the trial scheduled in February 2013, Cedar Valley
and the City settled the Underlying Lawsuit. In connection with this settlement, Cedar
Valley and the City executed a settlement agreement dated February 5, 2013 (the
"Settlement Agreement"). Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the City agreed to pay
Cedar Valley more than $4.5 million over time.
Because the City desired to pursue claims against PKH in order to recoup the
losses resulting from the Underlying Litigation, the City, Cedar Valley, and Snell &
Wilmer executed a Contingent Fee Agreement, incorporated by reference into the
Settlement Agreement. Pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement, the City agreed to
share a third of any recovery with Cedar Valley. Also, because Snell & Wilmer had years
3

of familiarity with the facts and legal issues in the matter, the City selected it to represent
the City in the claims against PKH, and also agreed to share a third of any recovery with
Snell & Wilmer.
On December 10, 2013, the City filed this lawsuit against PKH. PKH was already
aware of the terms of both the Settlement Agreement and the Contingent Fee Agreement
before the City brought its claims. PKH waited over a year to argue that the Settlement
Agreement and Contingent Fee Agreement amounted to an improper assignment of the
City's malpractice claim, and on February 13, 2015, after a year of extensive and
expensive discovery, PKH filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a dismissal of
the City's claims. On October 2, 2015, the district court granted PKH's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the City's claims without prejudice. The district court
concluded that the agreements constituted a "partial," implied assignment of control of
the City's malpractice claims to Cedar Valley because under the agreements (1) Cedar
Valley had a right to seek an independent determination of the reasonableness of any
settlement the City was inclined to accept and (2) Cedar Valley had an interest in any
recovery from PKH. The district court determined that malpractice claims are not
assignable under Utah law as a matter of public policy. The district court further held that
the City could renew its claims against PKH only if the litigation was not controlled in
any way by Cedar Valley and the City was not represented by attorneys associated with
Cedar Valley. The City now appeals the district court's ruling.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City filed its Complaint with the district court on December 10, 2013, seeking
damages for PKH' s (i) negligence and gross negligence in breaching the standard of care,
(ii) breach of its fiduciary duties, and (iii) breach of contract (collectively, the "Claims").
(R. 1-24.) The City's Claims arose from the legal advice and contract administration the
City received from its counsel, PKH, related to the Capacity Purchase Agreement
between the City and Cedar Valley.

A.

The City Agrees to Purchase a Well and Water Capacity from
Cedar Valley.

In or about July 1997, the City entered into a "Water Agency and Equity
Participation Agreement" with Cedar Valley ("1997 Agreement"). (R. 3630-47.) Under
the 1997 Agreement, Cedar Valley was the exclusive water agent for the City. In 1998,
PKH, as counsel for the City, approached Cedar Valley about entering into a new
agreement to replace the 1997 Agreement. Ultimately, Cedar Valley and the City entered
into the Capacity Purchase Agreement dated February 15, 2000, wherein Cedar Valley
agreed to sell its well ('"Well # 1") and all of the remaining water capacity in Well # 1 to
the City. (R. 3658-76.)

The Capacity Purchase Agreement reflected the parties'

agreement that the value of the remaining water capacity was $3,539,000.00. (R. 3661 at

,-i 6.) As a means of funding this purchase over a period of years, the City agreed it would
collect impact fees from developers whose building lots would connect to the City's
water system and would, as a result, use water from Well #1. (R. 3660-61 at ,-i,-i 3-6.) The
Capacity Purchase Agreement specified that the City "shall collect an impact fee of
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$720.00 for each equivalent residential unit of capacity as provided in the 2000 Impact
Fee Ordinance of the Town and under the terms of this Agreement." (R. 3661 at

if 5.)

Importantly, the City's obligation to pay the $3.5 million to Cedar Valley was not
dependent on its collections and existed independently of amounts collected. (R. 336064.) In other words, the City owed the money even if it failed to collect it from others.

B.

PKH Advised the City Not to Collect Impact Fees as Required
by the Capacity Purchase Agreement.

Subsequent to the signing of the Capacity Purchase Agreement, PKH advised the
City that-despite the language of the Capacity Purchase Agreement-it was not actually
obligated to collect water impact fees from developers, and should not remit any monies
to Cedar Valley. (See, e.g., R. 3409-11 at if 16 (citing R. 3504-24, 3605-19, 3526-51),

if

17 (citing R. 3722-29), if 18 (citing R. 3731-34, 3590-3600, 3526-51, 3736), if 19 (citing
R. 3738, 3526-51, 3740-41, 3743-44, 3746-47, 3749-50),

if 23 (citing R. 3785).) The

City contends this advice was negligent, a breach of the standard of care, and a breach of
PKH's fiduciary duties. (R. 19-22.) Specifically, the City alleged that PKH breached its
professional duties by (i) advising the City not to collect impact fees from developers
despite clear and express contractual language directing the City to do so, (ii) advising
the City not to pay any monies to Cedar Valley notwithstanding the fact that PKH
acknowledged at least some monies were owed and in fact some monies had been
collected, (iii) advising the City that credit letters from Cedar Valley existed to support
the City's defenses against Cedar Valley's claims when, in fact, such letters did not exist,
and (iv) advising the City against accepting a settlement offer from Cedar Valley before

6

the Underlying Lawsuit, for reasons unsupported by facts or law, that would have
substantially reduced the City's potential liability and exposure. (R. 19 at if 66.)
Between 2000 and 2007, Cedar Valley made repeated inquiries to PKH and the
City about the status of payments under the Capacity Purchase Agreement. (R. 11.)
Finally, in July 2007, Cedar Valley filed a ORAMA request and discovered that the City
had been using Well # 1 as a primary water source for the City for years, and had pumped
billions of gallons of water from it without making a single payment to Cedar Valley. (R.
12.) Between 2007 and 2009, Cedar Valley engaged in discussions with the City in an
effort to resolve the parties' dispute over payment. (Id., R. 3411 if 24 (citing R. 3458-65,
3787-89).) During these negotiations, PKH repeatedly advised the City that it had no
obligation to collect impact fees or to make payments to Cedar Valley under the Capacity
Purchase Agreement. (See. e.g., R. 3411-14 if 25 (citing R. 3787-89, 3791-92, 3653-56,
3795-97), if 26 (citing R. 3799-3807, 3526-51), if 27 (citing R. 3809-10), if 28 (citing R.
3812-26), if 29 (citing R. 3812-26, 3458-65, 3605-19), if 30 (citing R. 3828-33, 3835-39,
3841-43, 3845-47, 3605-19, 3415), if 31 (citing R. 3835-39, 3812-26), if 32 (citing R.
3849-51).) After the parties failed to reach a resolution, in June 2009, Cedar Valley filed
the Underlying Lawsuit against the City. (R. 2801-23.)
C.

The City Executes the Settlement Agreement and Contingent
Fee Agreement with Cedar Valley.

Trial of Cedar Valley's claims against the City was scheduled for February 2013.
Shortly before trial, in January 2013, Cedar Valley and the City settled the Underlying
Lawsuit and entered into the Settlement Agreement. (R. 3360-63; Add. 1.) The City's
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trial counsel recommended the settlement by reason that PKH' s advice and
misrepresentations to the City had made a defense to Cedar Valley's claims untenable.
The Settlement Agreement incorporated by reference the Contingent Fee Agreement. (R.
3362.) The City and Cedar Valley entered into the Contingent Fee Agreement with Snell
& Wilmer, who had acted as counsel for Cedar Valley in the Underlying Lawsuit, had

extensive knowledge of the facts and history, and had essentially uncovered PKH's
negligence and malpractice. (R. 3365-73; Add. 2.)

Pursuant to the Contingent Fee

Agreement, the City agreed to share with Cedar Valley a portion of the proceeds from
any recovery of the City's planned lawsuit against PKH. (Id.) Under the Contingent Fee
Agreement, Snell & Wilmer agreed to represent the City in its malpractice case against
PKH. (Id. at Preamble and ,-iii D, E, 1.)

D.

The City Sues PKH for Malpractice.

The City tried to settle its claims against PKH before bringing suit. In those
discussions the City disclosed to PKH the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the
Contingent Fee Agreement. After a failed mediation (R. 3319-23), on December 10, 2013
the City brought this lawsuit. (R. 1-24.)

The suit asserted claims for professional

negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. (Id.) The City alleged that
PKH provided negligent advice to the City about the collection of impact fees and the
payment of monies due to Cedar Valley under the Capacity Purchase Agreement. (R. 19
at if 66.) The City further alleged that PKH had a duty of honesty and candor to the City
and breached that duty when it falsely advised the City that written credit letters existed
to support the City's primary defense against Cedar Valley. PKH knew that no such
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credit letters existed. (R. 21 at if 76.) 1 The City also alleged that PKH had a contractual
obligation to provide competent legal advice and that PKH breached that obligation when
it gave incorrect legal advice related to the City's performance under the Capacity
Purchase Agreement. (R. 23 at if 84.)
After the City filed its Complaint, PKH brought a third-party complaint against
WH alleging that, as litigation counsel of record for the City in the Underlying Lawsuit,
WH was negligent in its representation of the City and responsible for the damages
incurred by the City in settling with Cedar Valley. (R. 141-67.)

E.

PKH Moves for Summary Judgment.

In spite of being aware of the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Contingent
Fee Agreement at the time of suit, PKH did not move at that time to dismiss the City's
complaint on any grounds, including on the basis of a purported partial or other
assignment allegedly in violation of public policy. PKH and the City engaged in
expensive discovery for over a year. (R. 3426 at

if

84.) Prior to the conclusion of fact

discovery, on February 13, 2015, PKH filed its Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a
dismissal of the City's claims on the purported ground that the City improperly assigned
its malpractice claim under the Settlement Agreement and Contingent Fee Agreement.
(R. 3065-3373.) Specifically, PKH claimed that pursuant to these agreements Cedar
Valley obtained a substantial interest in the legal malpractice case and that the legal
1

Under the Capacity Purchase Agreement, Cedar Valley was permitted to assign a credit
against the equity buy-in capacity for Well #1 to third-party developers. In the event
Cedar Valley elected to do so (which it never did), Cedar Valley was to provide written
notice to the City that it was not to charge impact fees to those third-party developers.
(R. 3660-61.)
9

malpractice claiin was somehow used as a marketable commodity. (R. 3094-95.)
Although Cedar Valley is not a party, PKH also claimed it was being forced to defend
itself against an entity with which it never had an attorney-client relationship, and to
which it owed no duty. (Id.) Finally, PKH claimed "champerty" was promoted because
Cedar Valley had agreed to pay the costs of litigation, and that Snell & Wilmer's
involvement in the case was improper. (Id.; see also R. 3107.) PKH, however, never
filed a motion to disqualify Snell & Wilmer as counsel for the City and lodged no
objection to Snell & Wilmer's involvement in the case for well over a year. In support of
its arguments, PKH relied on the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Contingent Fee
Agreement. (R. 3068-3108, 4081-4159.)
In opposition to PKH' s motion, the City pointed out there was no assignment and
that the language of the agreements did not support PKH's arguments. (R. 3426-29.)
Moreover, aside from paying costs, it was undisputed that Cedar Valley had absolutely
no involvement, let alone control, over the litigation against PKH. (R. 3427-28; R. 3832
at

ifif

18-19 (Add. 3); R. 3951 at

ifif 4-5

(Add. 4); R. 3957-58 at

ifif

17-19 (Add. 5).) It

was also undisputed that the City never received a settlement offer from PKH that it was
inclined to accept. (R. 3832 at

if 21;

R. 3951 at

if 5;

R. 3957-58 at

ifif

18-19.) Finally,

Snell & Wilmer's representation of the City posed no conflict. (R. 3426-35.) The City
submitted declarations to support these facts, none of which were addressed or rebutted
by PKH. (See, e.g., R. 3831 at if 14 ("[T]he City never intended to transfer or assign the
[legal malpractice] claim, or control over the claim to [Cedar Valley]."); id. ("[I]t was
always my understanding that the City would bring the claims and control the
10

litigation."); id. at

ir 15 ("The City agreed to using Snell

& Wilmer because Snell &

Wilmer was the logical choice . . . [because] it was already well acquainted with the
complicated facts of the underlying case and the documents related thereto."); id. at ir 16
("The City Attorney at the time of the settlement, Jeremy Cook from PKH, never
indicated ... that an agreement to share proceeds with [Cedar Valley] of a malpractice
claim would be improper or voidable.").) Instead, PKH (and ultimately the district court)
ignored the declarations and the undisputed facts contained therein.
F.

The District Court Grants PK.H's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Precludes the City from Using Snell & Wilmer.

On October 2, 2015, the district court issued its Ruling, wherein it granted PK.H's
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the City's claims without prejudice. (R.
2626-42; Add. 6.) The district court expressly advised the parties it was not ruling that
the Settlement Agreement or the Contingent Fee Agreement were unenforceable. (Id. at
7.) The district court did, however, conclude that the agreements constituted a partial,
implied assignment of the City's malpractice claims to Cedar Valley because the
agreements granted Cedar Valley the right to question whether a settlement was
reasonable, allowed Cedar Valley to advance costs, and granted Cedar Valley a one-third
interest in any proceeds recovered in the litigation. (Id. at 15-16.) The district court
opined that legal malpractice claims were not assignable and that, as a consequence, the
agreements violated public policy. (Id.) The district court concluded that the City was
prohibited from pursuing its claims against PKH under terms of the agreements and that
the City would be "permitted to pursue its claim against PKH [only] if it satisfies the
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Court that it will be prosecuted independently of the settlement agreement. To do so, at a
minimum, [the City] needs to establish that its litigation is not controlled in any way by
[Cedar Valley], and that [the City] is not represented by attorneys associated with [Cedar
Valley]." (Id. at 16.)
In reaching its conclusion that the Contingent Fee Agreement granted Cedar
Valley enough control over the City's malpractice claim to constitute an improper
assignment, the district court identified the following provisions from the Contingent Fee
Agreement:
•

The City's agreement to "file and prosecute a complaint against PKH . . .

solely on the terms and conditions of this Agreement" (R. 2633 (citing R. 3365));
•

The City and Cedar Valley agreeing to retain Snell & Wilmer to bring the

lawsuit against PKH (Id. (citing R. 3365));
•

The communications between the City and Cedar Valley and Snell &

Wilmer are not privileged because the parties are jointly represented (Id. (citing R. 336768));
•

The City and Cedar Valley agreed that each would receive one-third of any

recovery from PKH in the malpractice lawsuit (Id. (citing R. 3365));
•

The City and Cedar Valley agreed that Snell & Wilmer would receive one-

third of any recovery from PKH in the malpractice lawsuit (Id. (citing R. 3366));
•

Cedar Valley would pay all costs incurred in connection with the

malpractice lawsuit (Id. (citing R. 3366)); and
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•

If PKH made an offer to settle and the City and Cedar Valley could not

agree on the terms of the settlement, the City and Cedar Valley were required to negotiate
in good faith. If the City and Cedar Valley could not agree, then they agreed to mediate.
If mediation was unsuccessful, the question of whether to accept or reject PK.H's offer
would be submitted to an arbitration panel. (Id. at 2633-34 (citing R. 3369).)
The district court then surmised that the Settlement Agreement and Contingent
Fee Agreement granted "partial control" to Cedar Valley in the following ways:
I) File the present lawsuit as a condition to settle the underlying litigation.
2) Be represented by a specific attorney agreed to by [Cedar Valley]. 3)
Allow the attorney to jointly represent [the City and Cedar Valley] in this
case. 4) Waive client confidentiality with the attorney in this case to allow
[Snell & Wilmer] to disclose information regarding the litigation to [Cedar
Valley]. 5) Obtain prior approval by [Cedar Valley] before it can settle the
claim, or if the parties disagree, ultimately submit its rights to settle its case
to binding arbitration.
(R. 2634.)
Eagle Mountain filed its notice of appeal on November 2, 2015. (R. 2669-71.)
Thereafter, the district court entered an order dismissing without prejudice PKH' s First
Amended Third-Party Complaint against WH. (R. 2689-91.) Lastly, this litigation has
not permanently destroyed the attorney-client relationship, as the City continues to use
PKH as its City Attorney on many matters.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Utah has not yet decided whether legal malpractice claims are assignable. And
while Utah law permits the purchase of such claims from bankrupt estates and judgment
execution sales, this Court need not address the specific question because the City did not
13

assign its claims as a matter of law. The City has paid out millions, and continues to pay
out hundreds of thousands of dollars because PKH committed malpractice. The City
seeks those monies from PKH, whose negligence and bad advice led to a completely
avoidable liability. In agreeing to share a portion of any recovery with Cedar Valley in
exchange for payment of costs, and with Snell & Wilmer in exchange for legal services,
Cedar Valley did not assign its claims against PKH or surrender control of the litigation.
The district court recognized that neither the Settlement Agreement nor the
Contingent Fee Agreement expressly assigned or surrendered control of the City's legal
malpractice claim against PKH. The Court went on from those agreements, however, to
erroneously opine that the City transferred its legal malpractice claim through a partial,
implied assignment. In so doing, the Court attributed motives and conduct that the
language of the agreements, the undisputed facts, and certainly all reasonable inferences
therefrom, do not support. The City was the sole plaintiff. It filed suit in its own name,
through attorneys the City selected because of their depth of knowledge and experience
with the claims and many years of history at issue. The City was authorized to and in fact
controlled every aspect of the litigation. The undisputed facts showed that Cedar Valley's
sole role in the prosecution of claims was to pay litigation costs, over which it had no
discretion. Most importantly here, while Utah law has not embraced all of the public
policy reasons against assignments that other states have embraced, none of those public
policy reasons are implicated by the facts of this case. The City did not transfer its legal
malpractice claims - through an implied assignment or otherwise - but even if there were
some sort of partial transfer here, it did not violate the public policy reasons with which
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Utah is concerned and should, therefore, be deemed valid. Thus this Court should reverse
the district court's decision.
Finally, the district court erred when it embraced PKH's one sentence argument
and improperly held that the City could pursue its legal malpractice claim only so long as
it was not represented by attorneys "associated" with Cedar Valley. The district court's
holding purportedly disqualified Snell & Wilmer from representing the City despite the
fact that a motion to disqualify was never filed, the district court never considered facts
requiring disqualification, and the district court never requested that the matter be briefed.
The district court's decision infringed on the City's right to select the counsel of its
choice and could unfairly prejudice the City by forcing it to find new counsel, who must
get up to speed in a case that has over six years of history between the Underlying
Lawsuit and this case. The district court's depriving the City of its counsel of choice
nearly two years into the litigation was prejudicial error, and this Court should reverse it.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CONTINGENT FEE
AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED A PARTIAL, IMPLIED
ASSIGNMENT OF THE CITY'S LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM.

The district court incorrectly concluded that the City improperly transferred its
legal malpractice claim against PKH through the Settlement Agreement and Contingent
Fee Agreement. The district court's conclusion ignored the undisputed facts, and all
reasonable inferences favoring the City, and instead was based on its erroneous
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determination that the agreements constituted a partial, implied assignment as a matter of
law.
A.

Utah Law Sanctions Non-Clients Suing Lawyers for
Malpractice.

The Utah Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a legal malpractice claim is
assignable under Utah law. See Snow. Nuffer. Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT
49,

~

8, 980 P.2d 208 ("[T]here is no net(d to decide whether a legal malpractice claim is

assignable under Utah law in order to resolve this particular dispute."). While the Utah
Supreme Court did not reach that specific issue in the Tanasse case, it did expressly
sanction the purchase of a legal malpractice claim from a bankruptcy estate, or in
executing upon a judgment. Id. at

~~

10-11. In other words, under Utah law, a total

stranger to an attorney-client relationship may own the client's malpractice claim, control
it, and prosecute it against that party's lawyer or law firm, and keep 100% of the
recovery. Thus, Utah has not embraced all public policy issues identified by other courts
as important or essential to the assignability issue. The present case, however, does not
require this Court to delineate the types of transfers of claims that are or are not
permissible because there was no transfer or implied assignment of the City's claims
against PKH.
1.

"Assignment" is a vague term that invokes a broad range of
circumstances.

As the City pointed out to the district court, there is an entire range of
circumstances that would give rise to whether a malpractice claim has been "assigned" in
such a way as to violate Utah's public policies. (R. 3436-51.)
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And, the City

acknowledged that the majority of courts that have considered the issue have held that at
least at some levels, legal malpractice claims should not be assigned. (R. 3432-35.) The
City did not dispute the proposition that the Utah Supreme Court would likely adopt the
idea that in some circumstances the transfer of a legal malpractice claim for consideration
could violate some important public policies, and thus be barred. (Id.); see. e.g., Tanasse
v. Snow, 929 P.2d 351, 352-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that the majority of
jurisdictions have determined that legal malpractice claims cannot be assigned, but
recognizing that a small minority, including New York, Maryland, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania, have held that legal malpractice claims are freely assignable), aff d in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, Tanasse, 1999 UT 49.

2.

There is no need here to flesh out Utah law on assignments.

Here, however, just as in Tanasse, the Court need not decide whether legal
malpractice claims are assignable under Utah law because the City did not assign its legal
malpractice claim against PKH to Cedar Valley. Instead, the City entered into a
Settlement Agreement with Cedar Valley, (R. 3360-63), and a Contingent Fee Agreement
with Cedar Valley and Snell & Wilmer, (R. 3365-73). It is undisputed that, as a matter of
law, and as the district court recognized, neither agreement expressly assigned the City's
legal malpractice claim to Cedar Valley. To the contrary, in releasing its claims against
Cedar Valley, the City "[ e]xpressly excluded from this Release ... any and all claims the
City may have against its own attorneys, as set forth in the Contingent Fee Agreement."
(R. 3361 at

if

5.) Thus, not only did the City not assign its legal malpractice claim, it

expressly retained it.
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Similarly, the Contingent Fee Agreement, which was incorporated by reference
into the Settlement Agreement, does not include a single provision wherein the City
expressly assigned its malpractice claim to Cedar Valley or any other entity. (See
generally R. 3365-73; see also R. 3362 at ii 7 ("Except as expressly stated herein, this
[Settlement] Agreement and a companion Contingent Fee Agreement, contain the entire
agreement and understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof.").)
Accordingly, the district court appropriately held that "[t]he Settlement Agreement and
Contingency Fee Agreement do not expressly assign the malpractice claim to [Cedar
Valley]." (R. 2635.)
Despite the above clear contract language, the district court went beyond and held
that the City's "argument that it has not assigned the claim to [Cedar Valley is]
inconsistent with the content of the [Contingent Fee] Agreement." (R. 2632.)

In

determining whether there is an implied assignment the district court properly recognized
that '"the creation and existence of an assignment is to be determined according to the
intention of the parties, which is to be discerned not only from the instruments executed
by them, if an [sic], but from the surrounding circumstances."' (R. 2635 (quoting 6A
C.J.S. Assignments § 57 (2010)).) The district court concluded that there was a partial,
implied assignment because "the Agreements grant [Cedar Valley] and [sic] interest in
both controlling the litigation and in the potential proceeds from the litigation." (R.
2634.) These are merely conclusions that neither the agreements nor the undisputed facts
and inferences support. In reaching these conclusions (really characterizations), the
district court failed to properly analyze whether there was an implied assignment because
18

the district court did not consider the '"surrounding circumstances" of the agreements,
including the undisputed facts submitted by the City.
3.

The district court unreasonably inferred conditions and facts
disputed by the record evi<:fence.

The district court ignored the undisputed facts constituting the "surrounding
circumstances" that determine whether in fact an implied assignment exists. (Compare R.
3828-3833, R. 3950-58 with R. 2626-42.) It is undisputed the City brought its legal
malpractice claim in its own name and on its own behalf. (R. 1-24; R. 3832
R. 3951

at~~

3-5; R. 3956-58

at~~

~~

12-19.)

18-21;

12-19.) Perhaps most importantly, Cedar Valley had

no control over the conduct of the litigation. (R. 3832 at ~~ 18-21; R. 3951
3956-58 at

at~~

at~~

3-5; R.

As the City's own representative, Mr. Ifo Pili, testified by

declaration, "the City never intended to transfer or assign the claim, or control over the
claim to [Cedar Valley]." (R. 3831 at

~

14.)

Mr. Pili and the City's mayor, Mr.

Christopher Pengra, further testified that they communicated directly with Snell &
Wilmer about this case and they have never been involved with any communications
(directly or indirectly) with any representative of Cedar Valley concerning the
prosecution of the malpractice claim or strategy. (R. 3832

at~~

18-21; R. 3951

at~

4.)

There is nothing in the record to rebut this. Thus, the district court's holding improperly
interpreted the agreements without looking at the intent of the parties as borne out by
their many months of conduct. And, as set forth in more detail below, each of the reasons
underpinning the district court's decision is contrary to the law and the facts.
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B.

The Filing of the Lawsuit Was Not a Condition to Settlement.

The district court incorrectly concluded that the City's filing of the instant lawsuit
was a condition of its settlement with Cedar Valley. The district court's conclusion was
based solely on a recital from the Contingent Fee Agreement. (R. 2633 (citing R. 3365).)
The district court's conclusion is wrong in at least three ways.
1.

The recitals do not describe conditions.

First, the district court misread the recital. The recital states that "[a]s part of the
Settlement Agreement, City has agreed to make demand and if needed file and prosecute
a complaint against PKH . . . alleging negligence and related malpractice claims
("Lawsuit"), solely on the terms and conditions of this agreement." (R. 3365 at

~

C.)

Nowhere in the recital does it state that the City's agreement to bring a lawsuit was a
condition of settlement. If PKH refused the City's demands and settlement overtures, as it
did, of course the City was interested in pursuing those claims. There is no record
evidence that Cedar Valley made the City's prosecution of its claims a condition to
settlement, and thus the district court erred to broaden the scope of the agreement by
concluding that this suit was a "condition" of settlement.
2.

Recitals are not contract terms.

Second, a recital is not binding. A recital is not a contractual term between the
parties. See, e.g., Garrett v. Ellison, 72 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1937) (holding that a portion
of a promissory note that identified two individuals as payees was a mere recital and not a
contractual term between the parties). Therefore, the district court further erred in
construing the recital as a binding contractual term.
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3.

The facts directly contradict the district court's inferences.

Third and finally, the district court's conclusion is contrary to the undisputed facts.
The undisputed facts showed that the filing of the lawsuit was not a condition to
settlement, and the City would have filed a lawsuit against PKH even if the City did not
settle with Cedar Valley. Specifically, the city administrator's unrebutted, sworn
declaration, stated "[i]f the City and [Cedar Valley] had not entered into an agreement to
share proceeds as part of its settlement, [he] would have strongly recommended pursuing,
and [he] believe[ d] the City would have pursued, the legal malpractice claim to recover
whatever damages PKH's misrepresentations and poor legal advice had caused the City."
(R. 3831-32 at if 17; see also R. 3957 at if 15.)
The filing of the City's malpractice claim against PKH was not a condition of
settlement at all. At most, the City used its pre-existing intent to sue PKH for malpractice
to negotiate a more favorable settlement agreement with Cedar Valley and to obtain the
benefit of litigation costs being advanced by a third party, much the same way a law firm
might advance costs on behalf ofa contingent fee client. (R. 3830-31atifif12-14.) There
is no evidence in the record that the City's decision to file a lawsuit gave Cedar Valley
any control of the litigation. And the undisputed facts show, too, that after the agreements
were signed Cedar Valley played no role whatsoever in making any decisions or strategy
calls. Thus, it was error for the district court to infer from this vacuum that it did.

C.

Cedar Valley Did Not Choose the City's Attorney.

The district court's decision also was based on its erroneous belief that Cedar
Valley had a say in the selection of the City's counsel in this case. Again, the district
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court's belief was improperly based on a recital in the Contingent Fee Agreement. (R.
2633 (citing R. 3365).) Recitals are not part of the contractual agreement between the
parties, and the recital relied on by the district court does not state or even imply that
Cedar Valley selected Snell & Wilmer as counsel for the City. Rather, the recital states
that the "City and Cedar Valley desire to retain [Snell & Wilmer] to bring the Lawsuit
against PKH." (R. 3365.) The plain language of the recital states that both parties desire
Snell & Wilmer to be counsel for the City, not that settlement or anything else was
conditioned on Snell & Wilmer being counsel.
Moreover, the undisputed testimony presented by the City in opposition to PKH's
motion for summary judgment demonstrates that the City chose Snell & Wilmer as
counsel, not Cedar Valley. Mr. lfo Pili, the City's administrator, testified that the "City
agreed to using Snell & Wilmer because Snell & Wilmer was a logical choice to
represent the City in the malpractice lawsuit. It was already acquainted with the
complicated facts of the underlying case and the documents related thereto. Further, Snell
attorneys had been instrumental in exposing PKH's misrepresentations .... As such, we
believed Snell & Wilmer could litigate the case effectively and efficiently." (R. 3 831 at if
15.) Similarly, Ms. Heather Jackson, the City's mayor during the Underlying Lawsuit
and settlement, testified that "[She] was comfortable with the idea of the City's retaining
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. to bring the claims. . . . [and the City] believed Snell & Wilmer
could litigate the case effectively and efficiently." (R. 3956-57 at if 13.) Neither PKH nor
the district court pointed to any record evidence refuting the undisputed fact that the City,
not Cedar Valley, selected Snell & Wilmer to be the City's counsel. Thus, the recital
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relied upon by the district court-to the extent it had any effect at all-did not grant
Cedar Valley any control of the litigation and thus cannot be considered an element in
determining whether there was an implied assignment.

D.

Simultaneous Representation and Waiver of Confidentiality do
not Equate to Surrender of Control.

The district court further incorrectly reasoned that because the City and Cedar
Valley were jointly represented by Snell & Wilmer and the City waived confidentiality,
this was sufficient to give Cedar Valley some control over the litigation. But attorneys
may jointly represent multiple clients, and frequently do so, albeit in the face of a
waivable conflict. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1. 7. Parties may also choose to waive
confidentiality in a lawsuit. See, e.g., Strohm v. ClearOne Comms., Inc., 2013 UT 21,

if

61, 308 P.3d 424 (recognizing the sharing of confidential information through a joint
defense agreement).
Here, Mr. Pili's undisputed testimony is that he had "not been involved with any
conversation with any [Cedar Valley] representative concerning the prosecution of claims
or strategies undertaken ... [and he is] not aware of any other City official having such a
conversation. In all of [his] communications with [the City's] counsel on this matter, no
one from [Cedar Valley] has directed any communications to [him] concerning the
prosecution of claims

or strategies undertaken." (R. 3832 at if 21; see also R. 3951

at if 4

(Deel. of Mayor Christopher Pengra) ("I have been one of two primary points of contact
for the City in comµmnicating with our attorneys, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P ., regarding the
legal malpractice case against Parsons Kinghorn & Harris, P .C. . . . In all of my
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communications with our counsel on this matter, no one from Cedar Valley . . . has
directed any communications to me concerning the prosecution of claims or strategies
undertaken.").)
The City surrendered no control over the litigation by merely allowing Snell &
Wilmer to continue its pre-existing attorney-client relationship with Cedar Valley. Joint
representation and joint defense agreements are common practice in Utah. These
agreements do not evidence an impermissible assignment.
E.

Cedar Valley Neither Has Settlement Authority Nor the Ability
to Force the City to Accept or Reject a Settlement Offer.

Finally, the district court erroneously held that the City effectively transferred
control of the litigation to Cedar Valley by agreeing to obtain approval from Cedar
Valley before accepting or rejecting a settlement offer. The Contingent Fee Agreement
does not say this. It states in pertinent part,
In the event PKH and/or its insurer(s) make an offer of settlement to [the
City and/or Cedar Valley], and they cannot mutually agree on the terms of
negotiated settlement of the Lawsuit, then the clients agree to first negotiate
in good faith. Failing an agreement then, the parties shall mediate their
dispute before a mediator ... In the event the dispute is not resolved by
mediation, each of the [two parties] shall select an arbitrator and the two
selected arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator . . . . The decision of the
three arbitrators regarding whether to accept or reject the pending offer
shall be binding on the clients.
(R. at 3369 at ir 7.)
First, the Court should take note of the fact that PKH has never made a settlement
offer to the City that it was inclined to accept, and thus if PKH never makes an attractive
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offer to the City, the clause is moot. No "rights" of Cedar Valley have been, and they
may not ever be, triggered.
Second, the language of the agreement does not support the district court's
reading. Pursuant to the plain terms of the Contingent Fee Agreement, Cedar Valley
cannot force the City to accept or reject a settlement offer. Rather, in the event that the
City desires to accept a settlement offer from PKH, the Contingent Fee Agreement
merely allows Cedar Valley to comment upon and mediate the reasonableness of the
offer to determine whether such a settlement offer from PKH is "reasonable." Failing
that, an independent neutral may need to become involved. This is no different from a
standard contingency fee agreement between an attorney and her client. The district court
ruled that the right to test the reasonableness of a settlement offer amounts to a surrender
of control. That is not the law.
F.

The Policy Reasons for Not Allowing the Assignment of Legal
Malpractice Claims Are Not Present Here.

After considering the factors above and holding that the City partially assigned its
legal malpractice claim against PKH to Cedar Valley by granting ''partial control" of the
litigation to Cedar Valley, the district court next analyzed the policy reasons for not
allowing the assignment of a legal malpractice claims. The district court identified the
following public policy concerns: (1) avoiding the exploitation and merchandising of
malpractice claims, (R. 2637-38 (citing Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d
389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)); (2) preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship,
(R. 2638 (citing Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. 1991)); (3) preventing
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collusion, (R. 2639 (citing Gurski v. Rosenblum and Filan, LLC, 885 A.2d 163 (Conn.
2005), Kommavongsa v. Haskell, 67 P.3d 1068 (Wash. 2003)); (4) avoiding an abrupt
and shameless shift of positions in the malpractice case, (R. 2639 (citing Picadilly, 582
N.E.2d 338)); and (5) eliminating any distinction between assignment of a cause of action
and an assignment of recovery, (R. 2639-40 (citing Town & Country Bank of Springfield
v. Country Mut. Ins., Co., 121 Ill. App. 3d 216 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984), Gurski, 885 A.2d
163)). After analyzing these public policy concerns, the district court "adopt[ed] the
majority position that malpractice claims should not be assignable." (R. 2640.) Whether,
and to what extent, these policies come into play is a highly fact sensitive inquiry.
Because the City did not assign its legal malpractice claim, partially or otherwise,
there is no need for this Court to determine whether Utah law prohibits the assignment of
legal malpractice claims. Assuming, however, the agreements included some sort of
transfer, and even if that transfer could be characterized as a "partial assignment," the
undisputed facts of this case show that this case does not implicate the public policy
issues with which courts are concerned. Thus, there was no assignment in violation of
Utah's public policy and the district court's ruling should be reversed.

1.

The City did not exploit or merchandise its malpractice claim.

The first public policy reason the district court identified was the risk of
exploitation of legal malpractice claims. (R. 2637-38 (citing Goodley, 62 Cal. App. 3d
3 89.) In Goodley, the California Court of Appeals held that legal malpractice claims are
not assignable because "[t]he assignment of such claims could relegate the legal
malpractice action to the market place and convert it to a commodity to be exploited and
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transferred to economic bidders who have never had a professional relationship with the
attorney." 62 Cal. App. 3d at 397. In Goodley, the party with the legal malpractice claim
actually sold the claim to an assignee and the assignee brought the claim in his own
name. Id. at 392.
In contrast to Goodley, however, the Utah Supreme Court has already held that
legal malpractice claims can be sold to total strangers to the relationship. Tanasse, 1999
UT 49 at ,-i,-i 10-11. The idea of multiple bidders on a legal malpractice claim in a
bankruptcy auction or in the execution sale on a judgment is not offensive to Utah public
policy. See id. Notwithstanding that, the City did not sell or assign its malpractice claim.
The City did not post its legal malpractice claim on eBay or otherwise put it up for bid in
the market place. The City brought the malpractice claim in its own name, controlled the
litigation, and stood to recover from any judgment against PKH. The City's actions did
not rise to any exploitation of a legal malpractice claim.
2.

The sanctity of the attorney-client relationship is preserved.

Next, the district court identified the public policy concern of the sanctity of the
attorney-client relationship. (R. 2638 (citing Picadilly, 582 N.E.2d 338.) In Picadilly, the
court held that "[t]he assignment of a legal malpractice claim is perhaps most
incompatible with the attorney's duty of loyalty" because that duty can be weakened if
zealous advocacy could be threatened by the knowledge that "a client can sell off a
malpractice claim, particularly if an adversary can buy it." Picadilly, 582 N.E.2d at 342.
Picadilly continued that "[i]f assignments were permitted, ... they would become an
important bargaining chip in the negotiation of settlements .... An adversary might well
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make a favorable settlement offer to a judgment-proof or financially strapped client in
exchange for the assignment of that client's right to bring a malpractice claim against his
attorney." Id. at 343. Again, this case does not implicate this policy.
First, the Tanasse case shows that Utah's public policies are not offended if a
stranger to the attorney-client relationship is the plaintiff suing the lawyer. In Utah, a
lawyer representing a client whose financial circumstances could lead to bankruptcy or an
adverse judgment always runs the risk a malpractice claim will go to bid. Moreover, this
policy is not offended by the facts here because Cedar Valley did not purchase the claim
from the City. In Picadilly, by contrast, the assignee purchased the claim in a bankruptcy
proceeding (which Utah law allows), and although brought in the assignor's name, the
assignor had no involvement in the malpractice suit. Id. at 339. Picadilly has no
application here to suggest the City assigned its claim in any impermissible way.
Second, Cedar Valley never made a settlement offer in exchange for an
assignment of a legal malpractice claim. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the City
paid Cedar Valley over $4.5 million to settle the Underlying Lawsuit. The Contingent
Fee Agreement allowed the City to obtain the benefit oflegal services and the payment of
costs by agreeing to share a portion of any recovery. As detailed above, this granted no
control to Cedar Valley over the litigation.
Third, the City was not judgment-proof or financially strapped, and thus was not
susceptible to the sort of financial vulnerabilities that concern other courts. And again,
being financially vulnerable, as in bankruptcy, is not a bar to a malpractice claim being
transferred to a third party willing to pay value for it. Tanasse, 1999 UT 49 at iii! 10-11.
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Finally, it is undisputed the City was inclined to bring these claims to seek
compensation for the multimillion dollar exposure to which PKH's negligence subjected
it. Neither the Settlement Agreement nor the Contingent Fee Agreement did any violence
to the attorney-client relationship between the City and PKH, which relationship
continues today.
3.

The City and Cedar Valley did not collude.

The district court next identified the public policy concern of protecting against
collusion. (R. 2639 (citing Gurski, 885 A.2d 163; Kommavongsa, 67 P.3d 1068).) In
Gurski and Kommavongsa, the courts held that permitting assignments creates an
opportunity for a party to stipulate to damages in exchange for an agreement from the
other party not to execute on the judgment and instead to take an assignment of a legal
malpractice claim. 885 A.2d at 174; 67 P.3d at 1078. Those courts rightly observed that
when a party stipulates to damages, or to a judgment, but faces no risk of collection, the
damages are not real. It is merely a number that the parties generated through collusion.
Of course nothing like that happened here.
The City did not stipulate to judgment. Cedar Valley did not agree to forebear
collection on a judgment in exchange for an assignment of a legal malpractice claim.
Rather, to avoid claims exceeding $8.8 million, the City agreed to pay Cedar Valley over
$4.5 million in cash money, to the prejudice of its citizens. (R. 3384 at Resp. to

~

5.)

This was not a hollow judgment. It was a real and very substantial loss occasioned by
PKH' s negligence and misrepresentations to its client. There was no collusion.
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4.

Any shift ofpositions in this case is present in any
malpractice case.

The district court next considered the "role reversal" that inevitably occurs in legal
malpractice claims. (R. 2639 (citing Picadilly, 582 N.E.2d 338).) In Picadilly, the court
described the nature of a legal malpractice claim, which requires a party to show that (i)
they employed the attorney, (ii) the attorney failed to exercise ordinary skill and
knowledge, (iii) proximate cause, and (iv) loss to the party/plaintiff. 582 N.E.2d at 344.
"To prove causation and the extent of the harm, the client must show that the outcome of
the underlying litigation would have been more favorable but for the attorneys'
negligence. This proof typically requires a 'trial within a trial.'" Id. The Picadilly court
then explained that "[b]ecause of the unique nature of the trial within a trial ... the jurors
hearing the evidence ... would rightly leave the courtroom with less regard for the law
and the legal profession than they had when they entered." Id. at 345. That rationale is,
however, an indictment of every legal malpractice case, of any kind. And, to the extent a
legal malpractice claim purchased out of a bankruptcy or from a judgment debtor through
execution involves a shift in legal position, Utah public policy is not concerned with it.
Tanasse, 1999 UT 49

at~~

10-11.

Neither the district court nor the court in Picadilly explain or analyze why the
assignment of a legal malpractice claim would increase a juror's disregard for the law or
lawyers any more than a non-assigned legal malpractice case. And in fact, the Picadilly
court explained that "[s]hifts in position are inevitable as long as clients are allowed to
bring malpractice claims, and attorneys are permitted to fight them." 582 N.E.2d at 345,
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n.10. Here, there is nothing untoward about the City's believing PKH's advice for years
and then suddenly realizing that advice was negligent and wrong when put under the
scrutiny of the Underlying Lawsuit.
Thus, this public policy concern exists in any legal malpractice case. It does
nothing to determine whether a claim is assignable, nor whether here an actual
assignment, partial or otherwise, occurred.

5.

The City and Cedar Valley did not attempt to bypass public
policy concerns.

Finally, the district court analyzed the "meaningless distinction" between an
assignment of a cause of action and an assignment of recovery from such an action in
order to circumvent the public policy concerns. (R. 2639-40 (citing Town & Country
Bank of Springfield, 121 Ill. App. 3d 216; Gurski, 885 A.2d 163).) Here, as the district
court correctly recognized "[t]he Settlement Agreement and Contingency Fee Agreement
do not expressly assign the malpractice claim to [Cedar Valley]." (R. 2635.) Yet without
any further factual basis the district court held that the agreement between the City and
Cedar Valley to share in the proceeds of any recovery from the legal malpractice action
was an attempt to bypass the other public policy concerns. That was error as a matter of
law. The City settled the Underlying Lawsuit with Cedar Valley. In doing so, the City did
not assign or give up control of its legal malpractice claim. The City obtained the benefit
of having its litigation costs paid, and it obtained the benefit of legal counsel whose
familiarity with the facts of the case made it the natural choice. In exchange, the City
agreed to share proceeds from a recovery, which is standard in any contingency fee
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agreement. The district court's ruling effectively calls into question the validity of every
contingency fee agreement.
The district court erred in going beyond the agreement, ignoring undisputed facts,
and finding a partial, implied assignment here. Thus this Court should reverse the district
court and remand for trial.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN PLACING CONDITIONS ON
THE CITY'S CHOICE OF COUNSEL.

If this Court concludes that the district court erred in concluding that the City did
not assign its legal malpractice claim against PKH to Cedar Valley, then Snell & Wilmer
is certainly permitted to represent the City in this case. If, however, the Court elects to
reach this issue, the Court should nevertheless reverse the district court and allow the
City to use the counsel it chose to represent it in this lawsuit.
A.

The District Court Ignored the City's Right to the Counsel of Its
Choice.

It is well-settled that a trial court "must recognize a presumption in favor of [the

party's] counsel of choice." Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988). This
"presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a
showing of a serious potential for conflict." Id. Here, the district court neither
acknowledged the presumption in favor of the City's right to the counsel of its choice nor
found an actual or potential conflict. Thus, even assuming Cedar Valley had control of
the litigation (it did not) and the City's malpractice claim was assigned to Cedar Valley
(it was not), the district court's decision to essentially disqualify any firm that merely has
a vague "association" with Cedar Valley was error.
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B.

Placing Conditions on the City's Counsel Was Unsupported.

In the final sentences of its Ruling, and with no analysis, the district court held that
the City "is permitted to pursue its claim against PKH ... [if it] is not represented by
attorneys associated with [Cedar Valley]." (R. 2641.) Importantly, the district court did
not say that Snell & Wilmer, by name, was barred from representing the City. By
implication, if for example the association between Snell & Wilmer and Cedar Valley
were terminated, Snell & Wilmer would still be entitled to represent the City in pursuing
the claims to trial. Unfortµnately, the district court provided neither reasoning nor
analysis for its decision on attorneys. Thus it is difficult, if not impossible, for the City or
this Court to know the grounds for this decision. Regardless, the district court's sua

sponte holding depriving the City of the counsel of its choice violates the City's rights for
at least two reasons.

C.

PKH Did Not Move to Disqualify Counsel.

The district court erred because this question was never properly before it. In fact,
in spite of the fact that PKH was aware of Snell & Wilmer's representation months
before this case was filed, and in spite of going through expensive discovery and
negotiations for months with Snell & Wilmer, PKH never filed a motion to disqualify
Snell & Wilmer. No one suggested, and no one briefed, the existence of an alleged
conflict or other reason why Snell & Wilmer could not adequately or ethically represent
the City. Instead, the very last sentence of PKH's argument in support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment stated, without explanation or citation to controlling or persuasive
authority, that "[i]f this court dismisses the case without prejudice and [the City] chooses
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to re-file, [the City] cannot be controlled in any way in that litigation by [Cedar Valley]
and cannot be represented by [Snell & Wilmer]." (R. 3107.) The district court erred
when it embraced this back door and naked effort to prejudice the City's ability to
prosecute its claims.

D.

The Sole Authority for Disqualifying Counsel Has No
Resemblance to this Case.

Even if the matter were properly before the district court, the district court erred in
concluding that a firm '"associated" with Cedar Valley could not represent the City. PKH
cited to only a single case, without any analysis, in support of its argument that Snell &
Wilmer could not represent the City. (R. 3106-07 (citing Edens Tech., LLC v. Kile
Goekjian Reed & McManus, PLLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.D.C. 2009).) Edens is easily
distinguishable and does not support the district court's ruling here.
In Edens, a technology company sued its former attorneys for legal malpractice
stemming from the former attorneys' representation of the company against a competitor
in a patent infringement case. 675 F. Supp. 2d at 76. The defendant attorneys moved to
dismiss, alleging in part that the company had improperly assigned the legal malpractice
claim to its competitor. Id. The malpractice lawsuit arose from a settlement agreement
entered into between the company and its competitor in the underlying lawsuit. Id.
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the company consented to judgment in the
underlying lawsuit and the competitor agreed not to collect on the consent judgment in
exchange for "a partial assignment of the proceeds" from the company's legal
malpractice action against its former attorneys, which the competitor agreed would be
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considered satisfaction in full of the amount of the consent judgment. Id. at 77. The
settlement agreement allowed the company to keep any amounts it recovered in excess of
the consent judgment. Id.
Most importantly, the settlement agreement in Edens wrested from the plaintiff its
choice of counsel, and made that choice subject to the whims of the assignee of the claim.
"The malpractice action against [the former attorneys], although filed with [the company]
named as the plaintiff, is to be prosecuted by counsel selected by [the competitor], and
[the company] must cooperate in the suit." Id. (emphasis added.) Finally, the settlement
agreement provided that "all decisions relating to this malpractice action are 'controlled'
by [the competitor], with [the competitor] paying all litigation costs and attorneys' fees."

Id. (emphasis added.) Accordingly, pursuant to the terms ,of the settlement agreement,
the competitor selected the attorneys who would represent the company in the
malpractice claim. Id. at 78. The court held that the company improperly assigned its
malpractice claim because it essentially gave up all control of the claim in the settlement
agreement. Id. at 86. The court then dismissed the complaint without prejudice allowing
the company to refile its complaint if ( 1) the competitor had no control over the
malpractice claim and (2) the company was not "represented by attorneys associated with
[the competitor]." Id.
E.

The City's Case Contrasts to Edens.

The district court apparently embraced the policy reasons and rationale of the
Edens decision, but without any facts resembling those in that case. Here, as opposed to
Edens, the Settlement Agreement required the City to pay a total settlement amount of
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$4,560,000 to Cedar Valley, regardless of the outcome of this malpractice action. (R.
3051-52.) Additionally, the City (not Cedar Valley) chose Snell & Wilmer to represent
the City. (R. 3365, 3831 at ii 15, 3956-57 at ii 13.) The undisputed facts showed that the
City carefully selected Snell & Wilmer as counsel because "it was already well
acquainted with the complicated factual history of the events giving rise to the claims,
and the documents related thereto .... As such, [the City] believed Snell & Wilmer could
litigate the case effectively and efficiently." (R. 3956-57 at i!l3.) The facts also showed
that-consistent with the terms of the Contingent Fee Agreement and the Settlement
Agreement-the City controlled the litigation, interacted directly with Snell & Wilmer
throughout the course of the legal malpractice case, and never communicated with
anyone from Cedar Valley concerning the prosecution of the City's claims or strategy.

(R. 3832 at iii! 20-21, 3951 at ii 4, 3957 at ii 17.)
Without any analysis or even allowing proper briefing, the district court ordered
that the City could pursue its claim if it could demonstrate that its counsel was not
associated with Cedar Valley in any way. This robbed the City of its choice of counsel,
and effectively disqualified Snell & Wilmer from representing its client merely by
"association" with another firm client. The law does not support this violation of an
essential right to counsel of one's choosing.

F.

PKH Seeks a Strategic, Not an Ethical, Advantage.

Finally, PKH's self-serving motive in trying to deprive the City of Snell &
Wilmer's help is apparent. Since 2009, when Snell & Wilmer first began examining the
City's conduct under the Capacity Purchase Agreement in light of the advice it was
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receiving from PKH, it has developed a familiarity with the facts and issues in this case
that could not be duplicated without a very significant financial and time commitment.
No evidence is necessary to show the City will be greatly prejudiced and harmed if it is
not permitted to proceed with Snell & Wilmer as its counsel. ':fhis case has been pending
since 2013. The parties have conducted extensive and very expensive discovery. If the
City is forced to select new attorneys, these new attorneys would not only need to get up
to speed on the issues surrounding this case, but on a decade plus of history in the
Underlying Lawsuit as well. Under these circumstances, it is unjust and unfairly
prejudicial to force the City to retain new counsel.
Because the trial court, without explanation or analysis, abused what little
discretion it had to tell the City it may no longer have the six years of history and
experience Snell & Wilmer has in this case, this Court should reverse the district court's
holding and permit the City to move forward with its legal malpractice claims against
PKH with Snell & Wilmer as counsel, whether or not Snell & Wilmer is "associated"
with Cedar Valley. And finally, if that association causes any concern, this Court should
clarify that Snell & Wilmer may continue to represent the City if its former association
with Cedar Valley is concluded.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth herein, the City respectfully requests that the Court
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand to the district court for
proceeding with expert discovery and a trial on the merits. The City further requests that
the Court reverse the district court's decision depriving the City of its choice of counsel,
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including clarification that if Snell & Wilmer no longer represents Cedar Valley, it is not
"associated" with Cedar Valley for purposes of the district court's Ruling.
DATED this 18th day of May, 2016.
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.

J/L·

Mark 0. Morris
Amber M. Mettler
Douglas P. Farr

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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ADDENDUM
1

SE1TLEl\1 ENT AG REETVIENT

Cedar V11Ucy \Vat(~r Company, LLC, a Florida lirnitcd liability corripany, (';CV"),
and Eagle Mounhlin City. a municipality and pol ilkal subdivision of tbe Sta tu of Utah
('Tity"), h1:rcby enter into tbis Sl;t!lement Agreemcni (the "Agreement'') as of the 5th day of
February, 2013 ("EffeL~tive Dntt~"), !'or the puq'.JOse of sellling and resolvi11g ccnnin claims,
con1roversics and disputes between them nn the terms nllCI conditions :ind for the
considerntion i;ct forth below.
l.
!n.lQJJl.of..t\l~_J'!!JJ)es. TLwrt) is a di;;pute between the parties to this Agreement
arising from .the performance, administrntion and paym~nt trncle,r a Cl)ntracl between then1
dated February l5, 2000 that is commonly rcforted to as tli(~ "2000 Water Capitcity
Agtet~mcnt.' The di;.;pute resulted in the filing of tha.t certain legal action now pending in the
Fourlh JucJicinl l'listrict Oiurt for Utah County, State of Ut~i.11, captioned Cei;Ji!L.Yall.Qy.,Y.Y'.:t1ter
J:;_q.:,~Y:.,_Eagle M;_Q,tJnlaiu_(;itv~, C~1:w No. OcJD402122 (lhe "Litigation"). Without \vaiving or
c.:nnceclinf.>lhdr respective. positions in the Litigation. it is Lht: intent and purpose of the
parties to.this Agreen:1cJ1t to fully and completely settle, compromise and resolve all. c.lalms
1

amh::ontrovt~rsies

lmtwecn them arising out of or in any way referring or relating: to the.
Litigation ;rnd Un: 2000 Water Cap<1city Agn:emcnl up io the dtitG of this Agreement. Upon

execurioD of this Agrecrr1orll, the obligations ol' the City under the 2000 Water Capacity
Agreement shall be dcemi.;d fuifillcd.

2.
DJB,J1J..L%11liILl~iligii_tji'.)J1 The parties hereby agree that t>uhsequcn1 to ihc
approval of this Agrnement by the City Council of Eagle Mountain City pursuant to a
nieeting duly not:icNL n Stipu.lation, l\ilotinn :ind Order of Di~misfl:'il shall he execl!ted by tht:
respective counsel for CV and Uw City and filed in the Fourlh Judidal District Courl
disn1issing 1lw Litigation wilb prejndiec and upon the merits, with all pa.rties to bear tbcir

own coiit:> ancl attorney's tees.
3.
I:.&Xilli<.!ll.QJ: Gil:}~. As considenition for di8inis)><il of the Litigation and as part
of this f,grce.mcni, City slu\ll p:-1y jointly 1·0 CV ;rnd its COlil1Sel, Snell & Wilmer it1 t:urrc:nt
U.S. funds; tbe su111 ot'Twt11'vliHion EighL!·lundl'ed Thousand Dollins ($2,800,000.00),

without a<:;crn ing intc.l'est, pa:yment to be made. tin Lhc folfowing schedule; a) Two Million
D0Jh1rs within~;·~ l'>ut-:lnt~$s days of the approva l of ll1i:· /\gre~menl by the Engle
Mouim~in City ·Cou:ncil; b) .Five-Hundred Thous.and Do ll am ($500,000.00) 011 or before
.M arch l, 2014; and cl the balance of Thret~ Hunc!r~~d Thousrrnd dollars ($~VKl,000.00) Qn or

b£·.'Corc Fchru;ny 5, 20i.5.

0
0
(,)
(,)
(]')

6 1;!(~iJi91ElU~~(rn_sidt'.faU.!W·

Jn "ddition to Lhc mom~tary p11ymen1.s described
above, bq~i1111 ing r_l1~. the ~1:cond an .11; ·~r .'>::g.y of the EHccl i ve:. D:1 te, the Ci~y s~1'.tl! _pay to CV
the sur)l ol· One M.i!J inn Seveu J-Jund11! ~[l 1tiu~1r11d Dollar,<;(~ 1, /6U,OOO.CHJ) ($I.. /()l\·1
4.

0

•J -

Prindpal''), wi.thout accruing interest, as (nllnws:

a.
The sum nf' Seve11 HwJdrtd Twerny Dolhrrs ($720.00) nmttiplicd by the
number of reside11tH1I building permits bitted anywlrnrc in the City after February 5, 20J 5 imtil !he
$.L 76M Pdncipal is paid in full The City ~hall make these paymc11Lc; lo CV on a quarterly basis,
beginnfog on April l, 2015, and sh1ill simultnneou:Hy provide CV i111 accoun(ing of building
permits iss11ccl duri og the quarter just ended.

b.
At any time prior to the Cltis $1. 76M Principal obligation being satisfied,
CV shall fo1ve· the rjgh1 in the following liinite.d circunist1rnces· to ut ifizc ··n crcdit·to be applied by
the City nguinst payrnents owing towards the $1.76M Jhindpal. Upo11 receiving a writing from
CV rngue:.'1ing a credit against Building Department Plan Review Fees. nnd all Submiual,
Application, Procc~sing, Review and Recording Fees as identified in fhc City Omsolidntcd Pee
Schedule being City Resolution Nn. R-J 8-2012, which fees and monies the City would otherwise
h;we 1bc righl to coiled from ihlr'J part.ic,., seeking npprovaJ;; frofi:t lhc City, the City shall credit
•igainst the$ L 76lVI Principal the nmouut of any such fees and monies. These credits, if any, slnill
have Jlll effect on llK\ City'$ obi igations to make quarter! y payments to CV beginning two (2) ycms
after the Eifective Date, olher tlnm to reduce the total number of such payme1lls by reason of
rech.1ctions ii1 tlic total $:t .76M. Principal. The City shall provide to CV written accountings o:f these
credits on a qunrti;rly basfs, eve.rt if there <lre 110 such credits to report. By way of example only. ff
CVte.qL1estcd hi ,.,,:rili.ug a credit in May, 2013 of $500 towards a City pfan check fee tha! t.hc City
\von·ld otherwise charge In connection with a new building permit., such credit 'NO\Jkl hnve no
impaci on the City's ohligntion to make thdirsl pi1ymcnts tow'ards t11e $J. 76M Princip<il after the,
Effoctivc Dntc, rior on the. i.unou111 of such inith1l payments, but rnthcr the $1. 76M Princ:ip<1I. amoun(
wonl(J be rnd11ccd by the ·$500;00 crndit-aJ.crng Wi.th the llUtflber of srich payments made to CV by
the City; Thi.-: crqdit nwchanism ctmnot be used to avoid paymi;rnt Qf in1pact fees.

c.
The .pmties acknowledge thnr the City's payments hereunder arc for
con1plc1ion of the p:-tyments owed by City to CV for fht·. assets acquired by City from CV afi set
forth and described in the 2000 Water Capacity Agrcemcn!, including wiihout .limitation, well,
wa(er capacity, wel1 casing, wen p11mps, pipelines, water tanks, real propNty~ easements, ri.ghts of
way, nml r(,]alL;d in:!'rwnruciurc ;111<.l i1.nprovemi:~n1s.
5.

.t-'.htJ.~w1..Q.en~r..ol.I~0.!.t?.B'.if ...Q.Lt\.UJ~1<1i!!b'i· As part nf this Agreement, CV and the

City, for and mi behalf of thernsdV(;S and thc:ir respective employees, ag~)nls, rcprcsenlaLives.
inckmnitors, insl1re.rs, successors, and assigns, h.creby release and forever di1;char.ge one another,
together with their l'.:mpJoyces, agellts, reprcsentnlives, inclemnitors, insurers, sucl--essors, and
ttssigns, From any tmd all Cfai'ms. demands, liahilhies, damages, causes of action, cxi:.;ts a.nd
expenses, including attorney'~ roes, ar.ising out oi' or iu any way related to the Litigation und the
subject nu\Ht~r of thi~ Agreement. Expressly excluded from thfa Release are m1y and all claims the
City may have againsl its own <11.tonrnys. <ls s.et forth in the Contingent Fee Agrcl:>1neut idenliJ'lc:d in
pnragrapb 7 hereof The- foregoing rclcn~~c spcdfically excludes release from the terms and
'ibligatiomi of Lhis Agreement.
0
0

w

6.

w

CJ)

...,
-...:..-

;irising out of or related to tile t~nforcemem ol the icnns (rf this Agrccmelll, the prc\:<dling
party shall be entitled to recover its fC:asonahlc GOS ts and attorney's foes, inclnding
1~cc-.ountfog

7.

expe1ises.
10.t~.:filatloh,

Except as expressly stated herein, th.is Agreement tind il

compnt.iio.n Contingent Fee AgreemeJ1t, c::ontain the eutire agreement aml understanding of the
pat'l'ies wHh tespecl to the subject maher hernof, and ,integrates aU prior conversations,
.discussiol\S o.r tmdcrtakings ·Of whatever kind or Mture and may only be modifo~CJ by a
Sltbsequcflt writing duly cxcc.utcd. by the p<trti.es her.eto.

8.
f,cronteqrnrts"" This document rrrny be executed in one or rnorc .com:ite:rpart11,
whrth iogetl1er s'hal.l com:;titute one and the same docun1011t.
9.
81m:JJ_\11nt.Dl~ This Agrecrnenl may no1 be modified except by nn instrtnnent in
writing signed by the panics hereto.
lO.
l\(ls.Jjj.lQ11al Ac.lli,. The parties :"hall do &U\~·h 1\lrtht~r acts and things nnd shiiU
ex ecnte and dcliV(lf such additional dncnm1~11ts and instru.rncnts 11s 1rn1y he rci1i>Onably
riGC:e.ssary -or rcasonaibly" requested b;1 a party or it;; counsel to obtain approvals or other
benefits de~cribed in this Agrnemen t.
0

12,.

b,utJirr.rlzJi.tfru.h Each individual executing thi." Agreement do~.~ thereby

repte&enrm1d w11rranl to the other signers that the indlviclual has been duly auihorized
execute and deliver t11is Agreement in the capacity ami for the pHrty specified.

t()

13-.
JVIU.tM~lEi.tt.ti9;,llli1iOQ.jn P...Q.£1!!.Jn:.nt Pr!{IDUfil)QlJ.,. Each party has· pntticipntcd
iriiltei'ia!Jy Jn the negorialion and preprm1tion of this Agree.me.itt and any rehlled items; in the
event a dispute concern.irtg thi~ interpi-etatinn fff any pwvision of this A.gn:emerit 6r any relatGd
item, the rule of construction to the effo()t that certain arnbiguities arc to be consirued against
the party drafting a clocumcl\l will not ap1'lly,
1_4.
.NJ.UJ1.frQ.~P<..\I.LYJ1Qtt.',~_t!f.IJm:J_!lt£f.!:!):;i_L'i . . Except iis express!)' prt:ividcd herein,
n.ntliing i;ontfiiirnd in this Agr.etmrnn! is intended to bendiL iillY pe.rson or entity other tlurn the
partfo8 to this Agreement; and no n~prcsentation or wan:anty is intended for the ht\ne:fit of, or
lo be relied upon by, a:ny person or entity whkh is not n patty to this Agrcemei1t.

15
Nn Waiver~ Om:: or nwre 'vaivcrs ·M the breach of nny covenant, term or
condition hereof by eithe.r purly shall not be construed a.<: a waiver of a subsequent breach of
the, .~i1me nr of arty either covemrnt, term ()r c.:ondition .

0
0
VJ
VJ

.16.
U. iR~Uikcr..Ht'!'..tt.0.,. This l\grccrnenl shall inun~- to lhc benefit lif, nml be binding
upQn, the parties hereto and r.hoir rns·pective heirs, representatives, ol'ficl~r:>, ugcnts,
employees , members, successors and assigns.

CJ)

N

_.,/---;.{ J \

~\./

....

,f
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WHEREFORE, the pnrties have i.'.Xecuted the! foregQb1g to be effective as of tbe
Effc.ctive Date.
''CV''
Cedar VatJey Water Company, LLC

/.,..

/..-----1

Cr
STATE OF UT AH

.

/

I

:iJ,~Jember

)
: SS.

COUNTY OF LJTAH

~ ·
, 2013, before me personally appeared
tlrc~lO executed lh.e S.eulement Agrcem~nt herein

.
ilC"
· On
this J?
day of
-~
John w·aldcn, knmvn to me l t.l 'e

in behalf of CV and ncknowledged to me that hG excmncd Lhe same. for the purposes therein
stated.

Notary

~~~

Publi~

EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY

By _____ _ _ _
Heather fackson, lts :tvfayor
Attest:

Eagle Moun!ain City
0
0
VJ
VJ

Rt~corder,

Finnoula Kofoed

16:\·1356'.l

0)

VJ
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·ADDENDUM
2

CONTING!".i'f!' l<'EE ACmlmMENT

THJS AGREEMENT ("A~ireernent") is entered into effcctjve !IS of Febnrnry 5, 2013
wnong falgle Mum1tain City ("Clti'); Cetiur Villley Water Company, LLC ("Cedar Valll!y'')
nnd Snell & Wilme1· t..L.P. ("Attorney"). City nnrl Cedar Vl\lley are sometimes referred lo he1·ein
colleclivcly a~ "Clients."

A.
In lh ~ OUlHSt: of defendi ng r,g;frnst ch1iLtm l>nl\lghl ngninst the City by Codnr
Valley for, uniong other things hreuch of co11lract, Clly 11tUi lleen n<lvi;ed <tncl tocltly undcrsl<mds
rhnt it may hnvc claims !'or legi1I mnlprni;licc ag<1inst the law :fi rm of P•Hsoml Kinghorn Hnrris, u
Utah profossionnl ~orporntitrn ('"PKH"), arising from PK.H's 11dvicc to City rcgardJng nn
agr~ tl me n L cntilled "2.000 Town Walden ~~'el l ti ! Cnp11cily Purchase Agreement" (the "2000
r~grccmout"), entered intl1 hctWC•}ll Cedllr Vn)l.,:y il,nd City on or 11bout the 15 111 d\1y ot'Fcbrunry,
2000. Muny of the factii 1111d le-gal theories c:i me 10 the City's Httclltion lhrougil tmmy months of
effort:~ by Atlorney lo dt}mons!rnlc: \hut the City's 11cls und omissions on the u<lvicc of PKH were

in faci bre.aches of the 2000 Agreement, exposing City lo Cedar Vullcy's dainis for dnnrnges,
interest, and attorneys' foci: in excess of $8 million. T11ese facts and legal theories are also the
product of Cedar Valley's cxpencl'ing rnonie~ ont of pocket for costs towi1rcfa the litigation.
B.
To resolw. the above litigation, Cil/ and Cedn1· Valley hnve entered into that
Settlcmellt Agn::enm1t, di1tcd effective February 5, 2o:t 3, rel\olving all claims between
lhcm arising from th<:. 2000 Agreement in tlw action, Cedar Vnlley Water Company, LLC v.
Eagle f\l.lmmtain City, Civ. No. 09042122, fomth fodicittl Di8triet Court ("Settlement
Agreement").
c~rtniu

C.
As p11rt of the Seltlc11rnnt f\gn:e.1 rn:nt, City hiw agreed lo rnakr: ckmnnll nnd if
11t:1':r!t1d Cilc· antl prnsec11it n complaint ll,~i!im;t PKH in the Third .hiclicia.1 District Cmll't, Salt Lnke
County, ~>tnte of U!.~~h. fLU::ging 1rn~~igel!rn and related malprnctice duims ("Ll!l\lSUit"), wlcly on
lbc f.erms :md em:dititm1; of this Agr~·t:me:d.

D.
Cit'y t1nd Ccd11J Valley· dt1sirc :o r~t1dn Attnrl'Jcy w !Jl·h:ig thr;;. l.nwsuil ngllill:lf. P.KH,
in p<irt, bc:.~m;r;n t\Horney ha~ (JJ:tcnsive cxpl!dcnc:e witl1 :,ucl k1;owlcdg.e of the fiu.:ts nnd has
developed c:vitkuce 1:111p1 •orling ihc Clly's •:lnim~; agai11!it PKH ln the Ll1ws11it.

E.
In J:he Selllement Agrnt·.nwm. City anr.I Cednr Valky <1gre1~cl that aftl!I' paymeut of
cos I.~;, ead1 woulti n::ccive 0~1e-lhitd, omt Atlurncv woulcl rccdve <;S its fee for legal ~ervice.~ onlllldrcl, o.f tl11:i rncov<:ry, if any, from .PKH in ihe Li1wsu.it. To that end, the pm tic.~ arc entering into
tlti:l /\grcc1m;nt.

r.
C.licons and Attorney now desire to enter into lh.is Agrcc.rm:nt in accnrdnnce with
the wrms Hel forlh herein,
NO\.V Tl·fE!UiF.'()RE. i'J' ID ACillJ'.ED 11c1wccr; Clients <:nd At.tor!icy

n~ fo!lo~s:
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. CONF/D[NTJAL l.
Fee Pnyme11..t. Except 11s prol'idr~d hy Section 2 bt\1ow, if the Lnwsuit is resolved
by woy of an agrr.:ecl seltlcment, in consiclurn1i0n ol' the services lo be rendered l>y Attorney Jn

comrnction wilh the Lawsuit, Clients euch 11grel:J that Allorney is entitled lo one-third (l/3) of Lhe
sumi; recovered fiom PKH (including its inwn'1'r;), ufter 011l of pocket costs nre first clcductcd
from such recovery. In the event that the Luw::;uil is tried aud the court uwt1rds domages, mid if
Cily obt:iins an nwurd of 111tonwy foe11 und O>sis (d;;fined below) from the court {"Award''), the
Award shall not he added lo the damages portion of the Judgment for purposes of calculating the
one-third conti.ngcncy fee owed to Attorney. Ccd~r V11lley mid City shnll receive from lhe
Award all :;urns t11locatcd to Costs as ruimburscmcnt for their res[Jective obligntions n.nd
payments towards Co~ls.

- 2.
~1mr.:ll. In the event of an appeal in connection with the Lawsuit, Attorney RlH1ll
have the option to (i) represent City in appeal or (ii) withdrnw from representation of City, us
follows:
a.
Jf Attorney represents City :rnd City prcvnils on appeal or po~t-trial
moticm, o.r if the case settles or is in. any way otheiwise resolved during the pendet1cy of the
appeal, Clicnls shnJJ pay AtLorney forty pcrcenl (40%) of the tot11l sum recovered, if any, by
reason thereof, lr.aving their reRpective rccoveq to be 30% each.
b.
Attorney may withdraw, imd if Attorney does not represent City and City
prevails on nppeal or posHrittl motion, or if (he case settles or is in ~ny way otherwise resolved
during !he pcudency of the appenl, Cl-ientli Rhnll pny Attorney 011e-thkd (.1/3) of the tot:1l sum
recovered, if any, by reason there.of.
3.
,Cost11. As usc.:cl herein, the ti;:rm "Costs" rnc.nns s1.m1s expended for subpoenas,
photos. photuc.:opics, scnnning, facsimiles, telep hone lolls, cxhibils used nt hc<irings, depo!:illo11s,
emir! repQL'ter cos ts, reporlll, wiLMss state ment~. expert wltnt:t..~cs, nncl all other out-ol'-pockct
1:xpem;es directly incu1•red jn investignllng m Jltiguting the. Lnwsu !t. Co.<;ts shull 11 ! ~0 include the
out of rocket CJ-;pens1~S l'hnl Cedor Vnllcy an.d Ci ty incurred in connection with th\l prosccu!lon or
the ch1i711s on the 200() Agreement, wh it:h <1llll)Uars 1he pii nies ugrce shall be reimbursed fro m the
first proceeds of nny recovery on the Lawsuit.

a.
Cedar Valley and City hereby agree lhal in addition lo the payment of fees
ro Att-orncy required under Section 1 l\nd Section 2 above, and regardless of whether any
amounts are recovered on City's bclrnlf or the outcome of any lawsuit, ull Costs incurred in
connection with the Lawsuit. shall be paid by Ccdur Vullcy, but all amount of such Cost.q shall be
fin;t rr;puill from uny recovery received. To th;\l end, Cedar Valley shall pay Co~rs in 11dvtmce
when requested by Allorney or required by any experts, consultnnts or vendors.
b.
SHOULD CITY'S CASE NOT RESULT lN A RECOVERY, EITHER
BY SETTLEMENT, TRlAL, APPEAL, ARBITRATION OR OTHERWISE, CLIENTS SHALL
OWE ATTORNEY ABSOLUTELY NOTHING FOR ITS TlME AND LEGAL SERVICES;
HOWEYEH, CEDAH YALLEYACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT rs REQUIRED TO
REIMBURSE ATTORNEY'S OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS INCURRED IN CONNEC.'TION
WITH THE LAWSUIT, REGARDLESS OFT[-!E OUTCOME OF THE LAWSUIT.
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'l'epilJlW.tLQ.n. A.ltmno)' 1m1y 1e11ninu(Cl/caricel this Agrecmenl if lhe Clienls ure In
breuch of their o bJig11tio11s umlcr lhi:> Ai,tn.~mo1 1!. or t\llorm~y ' s lnvcslig111ion di sclo~es that
i:erta in claims do not <1ppe~r to lrnvc merit :ir are not cconomicully µrncl:icn l to pW'suc, ~lr i( the
Al!o rn c~ i~ otJ~crwi!ie rcqllired 1.0 do S(l, i11 l1CCCH1l11uce with the rules of rrofcssi·onnl i:on<luGL
governing nllorncys. The rclntionship estuulis]lcd by this Agreemen t is s11L>ject lo lerrninolion as
foll,rm:
·

a.
Attorney rcsr.rves the right to withdraw from this mnlter i.f the Clients foil
tu honor this Ag1·eemenl or for any just re11son as permitted or required under the Utah .RulcB of
Professional Conduct 01· as permitted by the Rules of the Co11rtc; of the State of Utah.
Notification of wilhtlntwaJ s.h!llJ be mudc in writing to the Client~. In the event of such
wilhdrawnl, 1he ClionL'i 11gree 1·0 promptly pay !he At.tomey for all Costs and obligations incurred
purniwnt to this Agreement priol' lo the date or such wilhdrnwul. Such withdrawal shall have no
effect upon Clients' payment obligations under subsections 1 and 2 ubove.
b,
Clic:.nts .r<",Scrve the right to tennlnu\1.1 ll1e r~~ 1misc ntr.tl'i011 with or without
e£1usc, and 1ihall noti(y the Attomcy in writing (\'f nny such lctminatlon; provlc!ctl, however, that
in the event C1ic111s renninutc the repr~sc11U1lio11 for trny Jcason, Clients mll!;t r ay Attorney the
iipplicnble conciugcnq· fee amounr spcdfiecJ in Soncfo n J :l.lld Section 2 11bovc on sums, it' any,
recovered by Clienls at llny future t.ime (whether through a judicial proc1~ecling, scltleme1it, or
ol:he.rwise) in connection with the LawsuiL lu the event of nny suc.h lflrmination, Clients ngrce lo

prnmptly pay the Attorney for ull scrviccli rendered by lhe Attorney per this Agreement mid for
all Cosls im;urred pursuant to the term.~ of this Agreement. prior to receipt of 11oticc of the
lermin;1tion by tbc AttCl.rney.
c.
Upon termination o( this rtlp.resentation by eill1cr party, Attorney agree.~ lo
coopcrnlc with any s11i:cesr,or counsel to nccommoclate a smooth tr1rnRilion of the rcprcscnlntion,
and upon

reque~t

of Clknts to turn over to City all p;1pcrs relating to the Litigation.

5.
Joint&QJ1re-sentution. Inasmuch ns ~ !11.wyer is prohibited by .Rule 1.7 of the Rules
of l'rnfossional Respon~ibility from representing multiple parties i11 matte.rs involving the snrne
subject matter without full clisclosnm to and wrillen waiver by the parties, it will be necessary for
each ol' the Clients to consent to Altomcy's joi11t representation of all Clients collectively.
ti.
At the present time, in light of the Settlement Agreement aml
notwillmaricling \he City's ongoing oblig11tions of payment to Ccdor V11Ucy under the terms of
tile Se.tllc1m:nt Agreement, Clic.nts' rcspectlve intorests appem to be aligned, und the ptuties
agree thtlt there arc ·no focts that would support aclverne duim~ between or among the Clients.
Cliont~ agree and acknowledge tlHtl !"acts can come. to light, nm! cil'c~rnstances ca11 change, such
that the Clients' respective "interests may come into conflict. Bach of the Clients ucknowledgos
that Attorney c.ould nM reprMent either of I.he ClientH against the other. In the event that uny
fact:> or c:ircunrntances were to r1rise crcnling u con:flict between or among any of lhc Clients,
AttClri;cy may be rnquiretl to withdraw from representing all of the Clients, und Attorney's
withrlniw~/ may require thnt each of the Client.~ hire other coLrnscl. Cl!eurn acknowloclgr- they
1111ty incur utlorncy foe1; tmd cost.~ .ln r~onnection with e,c\ncnting their new a_ttomey on the matter.

ti.

Joint representation also has conseql1cncc3 for the applicubllity of the
3
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attorn1:>y-clie111 privilege. Spccifici1lly, c:omnn;nicmions between tlle jointly reprcse.n!cd Clients
nnd Allorncy urc privileged us to third parties but arc no1 privileged us lo the CJienli; which ure
being jointly represented,
Accordingly, Ai.torney is free lo shure with bolh Clknts
co111mu11ica(ions ~\lid infonnntiou whic.h Attorney hos or obtains from nny of the Clients
respecting the instant cnso. Jn the event that Atwrney receives any infornrntion from one of the
Clients with instructions lhnt it be kept confid~ntin! from the otJ1el', Attorney mny bo required to
withdraw from reprc8cnting all of the Clients, u.rilcss the party disclosing the information
consents lo tl1e disclosme o:f tile information ~o (he other nftcr consu.llation. If Attorney is
re.quired to withdraw, cnch of the Clie!ltS may incur 11ltorney foes um! costs in connection wilb
educating llmir new altomey on the .~jtuatiur. .
6.
~onJJicls of Interest. Clients ack11owlcclgc that Attorney is a large luw finn whidi
lrns represented, and continues to represent, mt1ny different corpornte Qnd individunl client.~ with
various business interests in numerous industrie:;. Attorney's clients include land dewlopcrs,
home builders, contmctors, water right holders, nlLlities, contract bidders, landowners, oil, gas
und .mining cmn~1nnies, lenders, lnndlo~cls , 1enants, nmon.g milny others who hnve o~ inny in the
fulwc hav ~, de.a lings within Jhe Cily. It is l'os~illlc 1hat, duri.ng the time. Allt)rney is represeming
Cl ltims 1.rnd1:1· Lhl.s AJ:!reeiuenl, Att.orney mny l>e nsked to represent inte rests, belonging Lo one of
ALlnrncy':; pn::sc·11l or t'ut ure clients, which arc ndverse to Clients' in tere~ls. lf such n confl ict
were !ti ~r.ise bi:Lwecn Clicals ' iutcrcsts nnd tbO:\C of another presen l or ful11re clf.r.n t of Aum·ney,
Attorney reserve~ the right to represent the interests of tho other client with respect to thnl
parllculnr mnltcr, so Jong ns no substantial interests of the other client nrc directly adverse to
Client~' sul1~tanlial int·erest~ in the inntte1· for which Attorney is e11gnged.
<1.
Clients umkrstaua, con~cnt, and ngree that Allorney may continue to
represent, or rnny undertake in the foturn to represent, existing or new client.~ in nay mi1ttcr that ls
not subslanlially related to the matter under this Agreement, evei1 if the interc~ts of sucti other
clients in those other nrntters are directly adverse to Clie1its', and even if those other m<1tters
ripen into pr .involve liligalion between S\1ch other clients 11\ld tho Clients , Tn such a case,
Attorney will condJJct itself regarding Clients' interests as required by the Rules of Profo~sional
Re.spon~ibility.

b.
Altonwy u11d Clients agree thnl Clients' Jiror.pcctivc. 111r,rcemenl uod
snch ccmfllc!ing represcn t<1lio'll shnll not nppl y In any instance whe.Te, as n rcs11ll of
/\t tomr.y's rcprel-:mnto llon of Clien ts, Atlorney has ollt.nined sen1diive, proprietary or ol her
cou Cldr.11ti1tl iuform nl.ion of 11 11on1rnblic n11tl1rc !lint, If known to. suoh other client, could be us~. d
to the 111a1cirinl dl.'llldvmnngc of Clie.nl<;' i1t!eresl:i 111 tlrn m1111cr i11v0Jveci . No r shun ii ap ply to
pernill AM rrn;y to repr(:se11l an y cliel11 ag11ins1 Cliil11ls in nny liligntiou or sirnilnr proceeding in
whic.h 1\tlomcy reprc1\cnto Clients.
co nsc:nt

10

c.
Attorney nnd Clienl1l .further ngrei;: thnt nothing stntcd herein is intended HS
n waivc1· or consent by Clients (unless spedficnlly find clearly set forll1 herein), or n narrowing of
the J'equirements of, the Rules of l.'rofellsional Rcsponsib.ility regarding conflicts of lnteresl.
rt.
Cl i.ents acknowledge rhcy lrnde.rstanc1 the potential consequences of ~ucb u
prospective conflict of intc~rest waiver by viltuc of their busi1lcss sophisticution mid experience
with legiii malters .
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c.
Clients each (;onse1n Lo Attorney's continued representation of Cedar
Valley in connection with Ille enforcemen1 oJ, or ;iny clispute ari.~ing from or between the City
nncl Ceclar Valley re'/atitlJ\ tu, the Scttlcmon: Agrecnwnt. Should a displ1le nri~e between the Cily
und Cedttr Vulley rdating 10 tile Se1tlemeut Agrec111ent, cKcept as may be required by tbe Utah
Rules of t>rofc~sio an l Responsib ili ty, Attorney will represent the intem;t~ of Cedal' Vulley
ngnlnst rhe in!tHosts of the CiLy. City cuminlly htis ~epnrntc counsel us to the Settlement
Agreement, one! u11de ~ l<1 n ds !hat it must <.'Onlim;1e
.
rntnining other counsel to represent its interests
as to t/ic Scttk.mc.nt Agreement.

·;

f.
Nothing in this Agrecnwnt is i1)tended to nor shall operule 11s q waiver of
the attorney cltenc und work product privileg-es that nttachecl to communications between
Attorney nnd Cedm Vu'Hey pr-)or to this AgreemenL, :111~ informtttion rehlting to the Settlemenl
Agreement or Cedar Valley Wetter Company, LlC JI. Eagle Mountaill Ci~Y. Civ. No. 09042122,
Fo11rll1 .fociicial District. Court.

7.
,$_yltlel11J}:(IJ..Jmn.\llise.. In event that P.KH and/or its insurcr(s) 1m1ke an offer of
scltlemc.11t to Client~. 11nd they cannot mutually t1gree on the terms of ncgotinted settlement of lhe
1JrWSl1it, then the client~ ngrce to firnt negol.iate in gcmd foiLh. Fnilhig an agre~ment t11e11, the
parties shall mediate their dispute beforn a mediator selected nmong the t.wo choices of the

Clieuls by a flip of n coin.

a.
In the event the dispute is not resolved by medintiou, each of the Clients
shrill select un urbitxalor and the two selected arbitrators 1>hall se.lect n third mhitrntor. The
nrbitrnt.ion panel shall rcceivo slmultn11tlo11s posilion papers from each of the Clients within 14
duys of their selection, ancl reply position papers within? days fol.lowing tlrnc.

,,

!

b.
AL the req•ic:;t of either of the Clients_, without uny prior discovery by the
Clic-nls, the p<1ncl !\hall conduct• 11 no tnCJrc than 2 honr bearing pcrmitli:ng e.nch C1fo11t to present
their re:1sons for accepting or rcjec.:ting Lhc iielllcmcnl ofrer in accordance with lhc !Jiternational
Instil.Lite for Conflict Prcvcnlion & Resolution Rules for Non-Administered A.rbitralion in effect
ns of the datu or lhis Agreement. The decision of the three ·arbitrators regiHding whether to
ucc.cpl or reject the pending offer shall be bi11diog LHl the CHentH.
c.
Tbe arbitrntion shall be governed by ll1e Utah Uniform Arbitration Act,
ULah Code Ann. § 78-11-10.l e1 seq ., nuc.l the dt.:r.i,qion rendered by the 11rbitrulors nmy he
enl'nrcecl, if necessary, by rei>ort to Fourth Judich\l 'D i ~ tr ict Co\,lrl oi' lJl<ih County, Utah. The
place of arbitrntion sh~l .l Im Provo, Utld1.
d.
Each of tb.c Clicnt;; !!hull p•1y 1111e-holf of the costs nnd foes re.lntud to the
mediated and/or arbitrarcd settlement. Att01'11ey is not obligated to pt1y any costs o:f resolving
such n deadlock. Ally amount recovered by way of a 1>ettlement accepted hercunr.1er shall be
subjecr to the tenns am1 conditio,n;; of thLs Agrccmcnl.
e.
1\ttonu:y :ihtt\\ 1101 ruprnsent ciU1er oi' \he Client~ or olh~rwisc participate
in the urbili.'a1ion. If they want to be reprcscnlecl in the urbitrnlion, each of the Clients must retain
irs own legt1l counsel

,.

.,

8.

~Jl;c;.t:JJ(!.!.1.£.Q,v.u.'..r<>v i~i Qll!3.·
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ll.
Clients shall fully coq,crnw with the Attorney and provide 111! infonm1tion
relevant to the issues and subject matter o.1' this Agreement; pay nll expenses as required herein;
keep Attorney npp.rised oJ the whereabouts of iii: principals and ofl1cials; cooperntc in Lhc
prcparatio11 und Lrial of the Luws\lit; app~1H on :·:.. asonao!e notice for depo~ilions 1md court
appe11rnnccs, Mid comply with nll rcnsonnbt(: J\)quc:;ts made by Attorney in co11nectio11 with the
proparalion fine! pre1;entntion of the Liligntion.
b.
Clients agre(~ that as~;ochi1c cuunsel and suppo.rt staff may be employed nt
tl1e cliscretio.n nnd cxpeu~e of Attorney, and that a11y attorney so employed 1m1y be designated to
nppear on Ciiy'~ behalf or undertake City's reprcse/itation in the Lawsuil.
c.
All of Attorney's wm·.k product generated tu1cfer this Agreement will be
owned by Lhe Attorney.
·
d.
If in the course of representing multiple clients the Attorney dete.rmincs in
its sole discretion that a conflict of interest exists, Lhe Attorney will nollfy all of the affected
clienls of-such contlict and may withdraw from rnprese11tfog any one or more of the multiple
clie11!.~ to the extcnl such a withclrnw~I would be permitted or reqL1ired by i1pplic~1hle provision of
th1) Utah Rules of P.rofossional Conduc.l.

e.
A.tt.orney cannot fllld does noL wtmant, predit:t or guarantee resu.lts of the
final ontcomc of this or any case.. CLIENTS AGREE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT
ATI'ORNEY HAS MADE NO PROMISES, REPRESENTATIONS OR GUARANTEES
REGJ\RDlNG THE OUTCOME OF OR UKELY AMOUNT RECOVERABLE FilOM
CITY'S CLAIMS IN THE LAWSUIT.

f.
This Agrnement .includeo the entire agrnemeut between the Clicuts and thu
/\ttorney regarding this matter, and can only be modified if ;mother written ugreemeut is signed
hy the Clients ;m<l the Attorney. This J\grcement shall be binding upon bot11 the Clients und lhc
Atlu1ney and tbcir respective hcfrs, legal representatives ancl st1ccessors and assigns in interest.

g.
[n the event a di~pute shou.ld arise between Attorney nricl Clients with
regard to the: foe whid1 .is to be paid by Clients lu Attorney, any such dii;pule slrnll be re~olved
through cnmp\dsory arbitrntion in accordance with !he rules of urbitrntion, or fee disputes of the
State B:ir o [' llinh, before the Fee Dispute Coinmince.
h.
Clients represent that Attorney ha.~ advised Clients Jn writing of the
d"Hirabitity of seeking and 1111~ been given n rcu.~onnble oppmtunity to seek the advice of
\nclept!ndent lcgnl counsel on the terms M<i conditions oJ' this Agrnement.
i.
C!ienls acknowledge 1ht1t Attomq is not providfog tax advice to eilher of
them ill corn:cclion with this cn~ugerne.nl, nud tlrnt they lwvc teucl trnd \lflClcrsttrnd Attorney's
"Statement Df Policy Rcgnrding Tax Advice" that ii; incorporated into this Agrccmenl ns Exhibit
A.
rN WlTNESS WI-IEHEOF, the parties b.ive r.allsed this Agree.me11t t·o be r.xecutcd
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the date fast above written.
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Mark 0. Morris (4636)

:

Bradley R Cahoon (5925)

·.

·..

M. Lane Molen (11724)
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200

..
'.

Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1531
Telephone: (801) 257-1900

mmorris@swlaw.com
bcahoon@swlaw.co~

lmolen@swlaw.com

Attorneys for Eagle Mountain City

:

IN THE FOURTH JUDiCIAL DISTRICT .COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY,
DECLARATION OF IFO PILI

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.130300194
Judge Brady

PARSONS KINGHORN &HARRlS, P.C.,
Defendant.
. PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS, a
professional corporation,
Third-Party Plaintl:ft:

vs.
WILLIAMS & HUNT, P .C.,
Third-Party Defendants .

. 21117881

003828

I, Ifo Pili, declare as follows:

l.

1.

I am over the age of 18 years, a resident of the State of Utah, and am fully .

competent in all resp_e cts to testify regarding the matters set forth herein.
2.

..

I have been City Administrator for Eagle Mountain City since approximately

August of2012.

3.

Before that time I served aS ·a Management Analyst for the City from September

of 2006 to April of 2007 as Economic Development Director and Assistant .City Administrator;
from approximately May-of2007 J;llltiJ. beco:r¢ng City.Administrator.
4.

As Assistant City Administrator and· later as City Administrator I became

generally acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the lawsuit between Cedar Valley
Water Company ("CVWC") and the City (the "Underlying Lawsuit").
5.

During the Underlying Lawsuit, I conducted, or was present at, a number of

conversations with Gerald Kinghorn concerning the Underlying Lawsuit and, specificail.y among
. other things, (i) the facts and circumstances regarding the 2000 Town Well # 1 Capacity Purchase
Agreement ("2000 Purchase Agreement") predating and/or leading up to CVWC filing the
Underlying Lawsuit, and (ii) the City's position and arguments in the Underlying Lawsuit.
6.

Mr. Kinghorn told me and others on more than one occasion that the City had no

liability to CVWC for obligations under the 2000 Purchase Agreement.
7.

According to Mr. Kinghorn, one of the City's primary defenses to CVWC's

claims was that CVWC had given credits to the City against the $720 impact fee associated with
.
.
the 2000 Purchase Agreement. Mr. Kinghom said that CVWC had given him letters.

211!7881
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'·

· 8.

There crune a time in the Underlying Lawsuit when the court awarded CVWC at

least $4 l 8;871.34~ plus attorney fees; for· breachin~ the 2000 Purchase Agreement. :This came as
a surprise to '.?le, given what I had ·been told by .PKH. since before the Underlying -Lawsuit
began-that the City had no liability.
9.

I thereafter came to realize that .PKH's advice over the course of the preyious

twelve years or so had put the City in the position· of being sued in the Underlying· Lawsuit and
vulnerable t6 a potential judgment.in a very significant amount.
10. ·

,!

.•, · ... . .. ,

After the credit letters promised by Mr. Kinghorn could never be found and

produced, and realizing ~t- PKH's advice regarding the 2000 Purchase. .Agreement had
subjected the City to significant exposure, I believed that the City should hold PKH responsible
· for any damages it incurred, and intended to recommend to the City that it seek recovery for
those damages, and for any further damages it would incur by way of jury verdict, settlement, or
otherwise.
11.

In December of 2012, the City began settlement discussions -with CVWC hoping

to avoid a jury trial and potentially enoirnous judgment which the City lacked resources to
satisfy.
12.

The City and· CVWC participated in fill unsuccessful mediation on December 13,

2012. In that December 2012 mediation, I do not recall the possibility of the City's sharing in
proceeds of the City's eventual malpractice claim being raised by either party. When the City's
mayor authorized me to negotiate directly with CVWC, it was my idea to suggest that the City
may be able to· share proceeds of any settlement or judgment in the malpractice claim against

2lll7881
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... .....

1 .

I

I

PKH that I had already determined would be in·tbe City's best interest. These .discussions with
CVWC took place primarily during January 201 J;· . .

~..

.~ ·.

13 : . The City and CVWC' eventuby settled the Underlying Lawsuit, with the ,City

..

obligating itself to pay to CVWC a total of over $4.5 million oyer time. The -City later ente_red
into the Contingent Fee Agreement in connection with settling the Underlying Lawsuit; ·

In ·proposing to share co~tingent pr?ceeds :in an eventual settlement or lawsuit

14.

with CVWC;.the City never .intended to transfer or assign the claim, or control over the claim to ..
CVWC. During the time the City was negotiating settlement with CVWC ·and considering the ·
Contrngent Fee Agreement, it was always my understanding that the City would bring the claims _
and control the litigation.
15.

Also as

pa.rt of the settlement negotiations, we discussed using Snell &

Wilmer

L.L.P. as the attorneys to bring the malpractice lawsuit. The City agreed to using Snell &
Wilmer because Snell & Wilmer was a logical choice to represent the City in the malpractice
lawsuit. It was
do~uments

~eady

well acquainted wit4 the complicated facts of the underlying case and the

related thereto. Further, Snell attorneys had been instrumental in exposing PK.H's

misrepresentations and malpractice through the processes of the Underlying Lawsuit. As such,
we belie~ed Snell & Wilmer could litigate the case effectively and efficiently.
16.

The City Attorney at the time of the settlement, Jeremy Cook from PKH, never

indicated to me that an agreement to share proceeds with CVWC of a malpractice claim would
be improper or voidable.
17.

If the City and CVWC had not entered into an agreement to share proceeds as part

of its settlement, I would have strongly recommended pursuing, and I believe the City would
21111 881
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1-

i'

have

pursued,

....
"•

the · legal, . malpractice . claim: ·to· :-recover whatever . damages· PKH's ' .. . ·

misrepresentations and poor legal_advice had caused the City.

·: .-

t

, -,

•

~

·. .

•

18. · · Since· the settlement, I have been one of~o primary points of contact for the-City · · ·. :· · ,.
in communicating with our .attorneys, Snell & :Wilmer LL.P ., regarding ,the legal"malpractice
case against PKH. These have incfoded face-to-face meetings, phone calls, letters;- and emails ·
.· ;

concerning case updates, strategy and coordination of the City's claims.

·. . · ::· · ..

I

!. ... ;

19.

During the course ofits·attempt1o·resolve the·claim/ the City through its attorneys ·-:. .· . · ..

Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P.., provided PKH with materials in hopes. of persuading PKH to settle the·. • . · ··
I
j

'·

claim for a reasonable amount. Among other things, these; documents included the expert reports .
of a· retired judge and a law professor; each of whom had opined that PKH had breached the
standard of care and committed legal malpractice as to the City.

20.

.

The City and PKH attempted mediation on October 30, 2013, before this suit was

filed. The mediation was unsuccessful. PKH made no settlement offer at the 2013 mediation
that I was willing to bother recommending to t?-e City Council.
21. · . Since the -City filed this Lawsuit on December 10; 2013, it has not received any
settlement offer from PKH. During the pendency of the Lawsuit, I have not been inyolved with
any conversation with any · CVWC representative concerning the prosecution of claims or
strategies undertaken.

Further, I am not aware of any other City official having such a

conversation. In all of my communications with our counsel on this matter, no one from CVWC

bas directed any communications to me concerning the prosecution of claims or strategies
undertaken.
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c. ' .

. ..,. . ..

I declare. l:IIlder penalty .ef. perjUty, pursuant t0 ·Utah Code· Ann. § 78B-5-7.0S; -.that~tb.e· ·: .!" .:: . •..

·

•' ·

foregoing statements are true to the .b'est of my knowledge, information, and. belief: · ... ·.

,: .

EX~cuted on this.· ((, ~ dli.y ofMarcb,.2015. · ·" · ·
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ADDENDUM
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, ..

Mark 0. Morris (4636)
Bradley R Cahoon (5925)
M. Lane Molen (11724)
Snell & Willner L.L.P.
.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
. Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1531
Telephone: (801) 257-1900
mmorris@swlaw.com
bcahoon@swlaw.com
lmolen@swlaw.com
Attorneys for Eagle Mo~ntain City
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN·AND FOR

'·

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY,
Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF MAYOR
CHRISTOPHER PENGRA ·
Civil No. 130300194

vs.
PARSONS KINGHORN & HARRIS, P.C.,

Judge Brady

Defendant.

PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS, a
professional corporation,

Third-Party. Pla4itiff,
vs .

.

WILLIAMS & HUNT, P.C.,
Third-Party Defendants.

21148144

. 003950

I, Christopher Pengra, declare as follows:
1.

I am over the age of 18 years, a resident of the State of Utah, and am fully

.

competent in all respects to testify regarding the matters set forth herein.
2.

I am the Mc:tyor of Eagle Mountain City ("City").

~

'

':

I was elected Mayor in

November 2013 and began serving in 2014.
3.

As Mayor I have become familiar with the facts and circumstances involved with·

the City's legal malpractice claim against Parsons, .Kinghorn and Harris, P.C.
4.

('~PKH") ..

Since.·taking office, I have beep.one of two primary points of contact. for the. City .- ..

in communicating- with our. attorneys, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P .,. regarding
the .·legal ·malpractice
.
.
case against Parsons Kinghorn & Harris, P.C. These have included face-to-face ~eetings, phone
calls, letters, and emails concerning case updates, strategy and coordination of the City's claims.

In all of my- communications with our counsel on this matter, no one from the Cedar Valley
Water Company ("CVWC") has directed any communications to me concerning the prosecution
of claims or strategies undertaken.
5.

Since I became Mayor in' 2014, no one has presented to me a settlement offer

made by PKH, nor am I aware of any settlement .offer of any kind being made by PKH in this
case since the Complaint was filed.

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-705, that the
foregoing statements are trUe to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

211481 44

003951

:

Executed on this

"

Jj_ii:aay.ofMaroh, 2015.

.· ,'
.. . .. .

~.

~

. , ..
•

'

.-.

I

')

o

.

. -. ,
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Mark 0. Morris (4636)
Bradley R Cahoon (5925)
M. Lane Molen (11724)
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
SaltLakeCity, Utah 84101-1531
Telephone: (801) 257-1900
mmorris@swlaw.com
bcahoon@swlaw.com
lmolen@swlaw.com

Attorneys for Eagle Mountain City
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY,
Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF
HEATHER JACKSON
Civil No. 130300194

vs.
PARSONS KINGHORN & HARRIS, P.C.,

Judge Brady

Defondant.

PARSONS KINGHORN HARRJS, a
professional corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

vs.
WILLIAMS & HUNT, P.C.,
Third-Party Defendants.
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I, Heather Jackson, declare as follows :
1.

I am over the age of 18 years, a resident of the State of Utah, and am fully

competent in all respects to testify regarding the matters set forth herein.
2.

I am a former Mayor of Eagle Mountain City ("City"). I was elected Mayor in

November 2007 and began serving in 2008. Prior to my time as Mayor, I had served on the City
Council since 2006.
3.

As Mayor I became aware of claims asserted by Cedar Valley Water Company

("CVWC") concerning alleged breaches of the 2000 Town Well #1 Capacity Purchase
Agreement, dated February 15, 2000 ("2000 Purchase Agreement").
4.

At all times since I took office until his death in 2012, Jerry Kinghorn, the City

Attorney and partner with the firm of Parsons, Kinghorn & Harris, was known to me and to my
knowledge, all of the City Councilmembers to be the person most knowledgeable about the 2000
Purchase Agreement, its administration and the history of the City's performance under the 2000
Purchase Agreement.
5.

I consulted with Mr. Kinghorn on many occasions concerning CVWC's claims,

and discussed with Mr. Kinghorn my concerns regarding the City's potential liability for those
claims, and about the City's defenses to those claims. Mr. Kinghorn provided advice to me and
to the City Council in various settings including in closed session council meetings,
conversations, email, and through official correspondence.
6.

During the course of those discussions, Mr. Kinghorn advised me and City

councilmembers that a primary defense to CVWC's claims in the lawsuit that was ultimately
brought ("Underlying Litigation") was a credit mechanism contained in the Contract, which the
City could automatically invoke against CVWC.
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7.

Mr. Kinghorn also advised me and the City Council that there were credit letters

that absolved the City of its obligations to collect the $720 Well #1 impact fees and pay those
monies over to CVWC under the 2000 Purchase Agreement.
8.

Mr. Kinghorn 's statements about the credit letters turned out to be unfounded, and

I later concluded that the purported letters did not exist to support the credit mechanism that Mr.
Kinghorn had for years asserted had been invoked by CVWC.
9.

I also came to believe that PKH's advice regarding the administration of the 2000

Purchase Agreement had subjected the City to significant exposure, and that the City should hold
PKH responsible and seek recovery for those damages and any further damages it would incur
by way of jury verdict, settlement, or otherwise.
IO.

Around December of2012, the City engaged in settlement discussions with

CVWC. The City and CVWC participated in an unsuccessful mediation on December 13, 2012.
11 .

In the context of those settlement discussions and mediation, I do not recall that

the possibility of the City's sharing any portion of proceeds o"f the City's potential malpractice
claim against PKH was raised by either party during the 2012 mediation in the Underlying
Lawsuit.
12.

Following the unsuccessful mediation, I authorized Ifo Pili to negotiate directly

with CVWC regarding a potential settlement, which of course would ultimately have to be
approved by the City Council. I Wlderstood that in the course of settlement discussions that
occurred mostly in January 2013, Ifo Pili, on behalf of the City, and CVWC first discussed the
possibility of including as part of the settlement an agreement to share proceeds of any claims the
City asserted against PKH by reason of its malpractice concerning the 2000 Purchase Agreement.
13.

I was comfortable with the idea of the City's retaining Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. to

bring the claims. Snell & Wilmer was a logical choice to represent the City in the malpractice
lawsuit because it was already well acquainted with the complicated factual history of the events

003956

giving rise to the claims, and the documents related thereto. Further, Snell & Wilmer attorneys
had been instrumental in exposing PKH's misrepresentations to and wrong legal advice through
the processes of the Underlying Lawsuit. As such, we believed Snell & Wilmer could litigate the
case effectively and efficiently.
14.

I do not remember Mr. Cook, the City Attorney in February, 2014, or anyone else

from PKH stating, before the Settlement Agreement was entered into on February 5, 2013, that a
contingent agreement to share proceeds of a malpractice lawsuit would be improper or voidable.
15.

Regardless of whether the City had entered into an agreement to share proceeds as

part of any settlement, I believe the City would have pursued the legal malpractice claim to
recover damages it incurred in the Underlying Litigation.
16.

After settling the Underlying Lawsuit in February 2013, the City then attempted

in good faith to resolve the claim against PKH without having to file a lawsuit. The City made
extraordinary efforts to avoid publicity about the case, and we made a conscious choice to not
pursue Mr. Kinghom's estate.
17.

Since the February 2013 settlement, and until I left office at the end of2013, I

was one of two primary points of contact for the City in communicating with our attorneys, Snell
& Wilmer L.L.P., regarding the legal malpractice case against PKH. These included face-to-face

meetings, phone calls, letters, and emails concerning case updates, strategy and coordination of
the City's claims.
18.

As part of the efforts to settle the legal malpractice claim against PKH, the City

and PKH attempted mediation on October 30, 2013. The mediation was unsuccessful. PKH
made no settlement offer at the mediation that I was willing to recommend to the City Council
for approval.
19.

Since the unsuccessful 2013 mediation until I left my position as Mayor, I am

aware of no settlement offers of any kind made by PKH in this case. Also during that time I was
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not involved with any conversation with CVWC about litigation strategy or any other decision
making on any issue in the case. Further, I am not aware of any other City official having such a
conversation.

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-705, that the
foregoing statements are true to the best of my knowledge, infonnation, and belief.
Executed on this_}/__ day of March, 2015.
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ADDENDUM
6

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

vs.

PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS,
Defendant.

PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS,

Case No. 130300194

Third-Party Plaintiff,

JUdge James Brady

vs.

WILLIAMS & HUNT, P.C.;

et

al.

Third-Party Defendants.

This matter comes before the court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Defendant seeks the dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint on the basis that Plaintiff bas assigned
interests in its legal malpractice lawsuit in a manner that violates public policy. l:ilaintiff's
complaint includes three separate causes of action. The first cause of action is based on a claim
that Defendant negligently performed its duties a legal counsel for Plaintiff. The second cause of
action is based on a claim that Defendants breached its fiduciary duties as legal counsel to
Plaintiff. The third cause of action is based on a claim that Defendant breached contractual
obligations owed to Plaintiff as legal counsel. All three causes of action are based on the
attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, and Plaintiff alleges Defendant's
Page 1
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deficient legal services violated standards, established in both tort and contract. All three of
Plaintiffs claims have in common Lhat they allege legal malpractice by Defendant. The parties
briefed and argued this motion on the basis of the <lSsignment of a legal malpractice claim and

did not diflerentiate between the three types of malpractice alleged in the complaint. Neither
party argued for individual causes of action to be dismissed or to survive. After reviewing the
memoranda, affidavits, exhibits, pleadings on file and hearing the parties' oral arguments, the
court took this motion under advisement. Having considered the facts and issues presented, the
court now enters this ruling GRANTING defendant's motion. In granting this motion, the Court
intends this order to dis.miss all three causes of action, without prejudice, subject to Plaintiff's
right to re-file its Complaint if it meets the conditions stated below.
The standard for summary judgement applied by the Court is that summary judgment
"shall be rendered if the pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file,
together with the affidavits, jf any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), URCP.
Additionally, "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Jackson v Mateus, 2003 UT 18, §2, 70 P .3d 78 (internal
citation omitted). Summary judgement "denies the opportunity of trial (and so] should be granted
only when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable probability the party moved against could
prevail." Utah Stale Univ. Of AgTi C. And Applied ci. V. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 7 I 5, 720 n. l.4
(Utah 1982).
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
Defendant's motion addresses two legal issues, 1) Does Eagle Mountain City's (''EMC")
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Settlement Agreement with Cedar Valley Water Company ("CVWC") and their joint Contingent
Fee Agreement with Snell & Will mer ("SW"), (here after jointly referred to as "Agreements")
constitute an assignment of a malpractice claim; and, 2) If it is an assignment of a malpractice
claim does it bar EMC from pursuing its malpractice claims against Parsons Kinghorn Harris
("PKI-I"). Both parties spent much time and effort informing the Court of the facts and issues
raised in the underlying case, most of which are not material to either question. From the
affidavits and other evidence presented, the comt finds the following facts are both material and
uncontested:

l.

EMC is suing PKH claiming legal malpractice based on tort and contract theories.

2.

EMC alleges, among other things, that:
a.

Pursuant to the 2001 Town Well #1 Capacity Purchase Agreement, an Impact Fee
Ordinance ("IFO") was enacted by EMC, City Ordinance No.'00-02, in 2000.

b.

Under the terms ofthe IFO, EMC would collect impact fees under certain specific
triggering events from "development applicants" that transferred water rights to
EMC which relied on Well #1 as the point of diversion.

c.

EMC did not collect impact foes from developers based on PKH's alleged
incorrect advice.

d.

PKH, tlu·ough attorney Gerry Kinghorn, who was EMC's City Attorney, allegedly
incorrectly advised EMC from 2000 through 2011 not to collect impact fees.

e.

PKH's improper advice allegedly damaged EMC because EMC is required to pay
CVWC money it would not have had to pay if EMC had collected impact fees
from developers, including $4,560,000 that EMC is required to pay CVWC as
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part of the February 5, 2013 Settlement of the Underlying Case. This allegedly
constitutes professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of
contract.
3.

Snell & Willmer represented CVWC in the Underlying Case against EMC.

4.

On February 5, 2013, EMC and CVWC finalized the settlement of the underlying case
and memorialized it in a signed written Settlement Agreement and a separate Contingent
Fee Agreement.

5.

Excluded from the Release contained in the Settlement Agreement "are any and all claims
[EMC] may have against its own attorneys [PKH], as set forth in the Contingent Fee
Agreement identified in paragraph 7" of the Settlement Agreement.

6.

Paragraph 7 of the Settlement Agreement, entitled .. Integration," states: Except as
expressly stated herein, this Agreement and a companion Contingent Fee Agreement,
contain the entire agreement and understanding of the parties with respect to the subject
matter hereof, and integrates all prior conversations, discussions or undertakings of
whatever kind or nature and may only be modified by a subsequent writing duly executed

by the parties hereto.
7.

EMC and CVWC entered into the Contingent Fee Agreement in connection with settling
the underlying Case.

8.

The Contingent Fee Agreement is binding upon EMC, CVWC and SW and their
respective heirs, legal representatives and successors and assigns in interest.

9.

The Contingent Fee Agreement provides among other things that:
a.

As part of the settlement of the Underlying Case, EMC is obligated to file and
Page 4

002629

prosecute the Malpractice Case against PKH.
b.

Both EMC and CVWC retain SW as their attorney to prosecute the Malpractice
Case on EMC's and CVWC's behalf against PKH.

c.

Since both CVWC and EMC are clients of SW, "communications between the
jointly represented Clients and [SW] are priviteged as to third parties but are not
privileged as to the Clients which are being jointly represented. Accordingly,
[SW] is free to share with both Clients communications and information which
[SW] has or obtains from any of the Clients respecting the [Malpractice Case]."

d.

EMC, CVWC., and SW will each receive one-third of any recovery from PKH in
the Malpractice Case, after payment of costs, and absent an appeal.

e.

SW's one-third contingent fee is calculated on the amount of sums recovered from
PKH (including its insurers), after out of pocket expenses are first deducted from
such recovery.

f.

All costs incurred in connection with the Malpractice Case shall be paid by
CVWC, including payments in advance when requested by SW, and such costs
shall be reimbursed to CVWC first from any recovery realized in the Malpractice
Case. Those costs include ''sums expended for subpoenas, photos, photocopies,
scanning, facsimiles, telephone calls, exhibits used at hearings, depositions, court
reporter costs, repo11s, witness statements, expert witnesses, and all other out-ofpocket expenses directly incurred in investigating or litigating the [Malpractice
Case against PKH].

g.

Costs shall also include the out of pocket expenses that [CVWC] and [EMC]
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incurred in connection with the prosecution of the claims on the 2000 Agreement,
which amounts the patties agree shall be reimbursed from the first proceeds of any
recovery on the [Ma1practice Case against PKH] .
h.

EMC cannot settle the Malpractice Case without CVWC's consent Absent

mutual agreement, the parties must first mediate and subsequently submit, if
necessary, to mandatory arbitration.
1.

EMC and CVWC consent to SW's continued representation of CVWC in
connection with the enforcement of, or any dispute arising from or between
[EMC] and [CVWC) relating to the Settlement Agreement [in the Underlying
Case]. Should a dispute arise between [EMC] and [CVWC] relating to the
Settlement Agreement. except as may be required by the Utah Rules of
Professional Responsibility, [SW] viill represent the interests of [CVWC] against

the interests of [EMC].
10.

John Walden signed the Contingent Fee Agreement on behalf of CVW C as its Managing
Member.

11 .

Ifo Pili signed the Contingent Fee Agreement on behalf of EMC as its City Administrator.

J2.

Mark Morris signed the Contingent Fee Agreement on behalf of SW as a Partner.
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ANALYSIS:
Docs the Settlement Agreement and the Contingent Free Agreement Constitute an
Assignment of EMC's Claim of Legal Malpractice.
It is important to note that although PKH asks the court to declare the Agreements are

11ne11forceable, nothing in this ruling is intended to rnle on the enforceability or respective rights
of SW, CVWC and EMC in the Settlement Agreement and Contingent Fee Agreement. These are
issues bet\-veen SW, CVWC and EMC and are not before this court. A resolution of those issues
would require, at a minimum, the inclusion of SW and CVWC as parties, and an opp01iunity to
be heard. The issue before this court is not the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement and
Contingent Fee Agreement between its interested parties, but rather whether as a consequence of
entering these agreements, has EMC apparently assigned interests in a legal malpractice claim,
and if so, does the assignment violate public policy.
EMC argues the Contingency Fee Agreement is me.rely a means of EMC sharing

proceeds with CVWC, a common practice. The Cou1t disagrees. EM C's argument that it has not
assigned the claim to CVWC are inconsistent with the content of the Agreement. Even the
Recitals to the Contingency Fee Agreement provides that, "City [EMC] and Cedar Valley
[CVWC] desire to retain Attorney to bring the Lawsuit against PKH ... "This provision
begs the question, if CVWC did not receive even an assignment of interest in EM C's claims,
why does CVWC "desire to retain the attorney" to pursue the claim? Paragraph 5, 5 b.; and 6 e.

of the Contingency Fee Agreement also support the position that EMC and CVWC believe they
each have the need for legal representation to pursue their interests in the EMC malpractice
claim.
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The Court finds the following provisions of the Contingent Fee Agreement grant some of
EMC's interests 1n the current case to CVWC:
a.

As part of the settlement of the Underlying Case, EMC agrees to ... file and
prosecute a complaint against PKH ... alleging negligence and related
malpractice claims, solely on the terms and conditions of this agreement

(Contingent Fee Agreement, Recitals .Paragraph C).
b.

City [EMC] and Cedar Valley [CVWC) desire to retain Attorney [SW] to bring
the lawsuit against PKH... (Contingent Fee Agreement, RecitaJs Paragraph D).

c.

. .. communications between the jointly represented Clients [EMC and CVWC]
and Attorney [SW) are privileged as to third parties but are not privileged as to the
Clients which are being jointly represented. (Contingent Fee Agreement,
Paragraph 5.b)

d.

In the Settlement Agreement, City [EMC] and Cedar Valley [CVWC] agreed that
after payment of costs, each would receive one third ... of the recovery, if any,

from PKH in the Lawsuit. (Contingent Fee Agreement Recital Paragraph E).
e.

Clients each agree that Attorney (SW] is entitled to one-third (I/3) of the sums
recovered from PKH (including its insurers), after out of pocket costs are first
deducted from such recovery. (Contingent Fee Agreement, Paragraph 1).

f.

. .. all costs incurred in connection with the Lawsuit shall be paid by Cedar Valley
[CVWC] but all amount of such costs shall be first repaid paid from any recovery
received. (Contingent Fee Agreement Paragraph, 3.a).

g.

In the event PKH (and/or its insurers) make an offer of settlement to Clients, and
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they can not mutually agree on the terms of negotiated settlement of the Lawsuit,
then the clients agree first to negotiate ill good faith. Failing an agreement then the
parties agree to mediate their dispute before a mediator .. .
a. In the event the dispute is not resolved by mediation, each of the two
parties shall select an arbitrator and the two selected arbitrators shall select
a third arbitrator ...
b .... The decision of the three arbitrators whether to accept ofreject the
pending offer shall be binding on the clients.. .
Contingent Fee Agreement, Paragraph 7).

Assignment of Control of Litigation.
Assignment of rights to a legal claim, or chose in action, may include assignment of the
right to control litigation of the claim, an<Vor assignment of property interest in the proceeds
from the litigation. EMC argues the Agreements only grant CVWC an interest in the potential
proceeds from the litigation, the Court disagrees. The Court finds that the Agreements grant
CVWC and interest in botl1 controlling the litigation and in the potential proceeds from the
litigation. The provisions of the Agreements requiring EMC to l)File the present lawsuit as a
condition to settle the underlying litigation. 2)Be represented by a specific attorney agreed to by

CVWC. 3) Allow the attorney to jointly represent EMC and CVWC in this case. 4)\Vaive client
confidentiality with the attorney in this case lo allow SW to disclose information regarding the
litigation to CVWC. 5)0btain prior approval by CVWC before it can settle the claim, or if the
parties disagree, ultimately submit its rights to settle its case to binding arbitration.
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The Settlement Agreement states it is integrated with the Contingent Fee Agreement.
Therefore CVWC appears to have the ability to enforce these conditions, with the threat that
EMC will suffer the consequences of a failed Settlement Agreement in the underlying case if
EMC were to exercise independence in controlling its litigation decisions. Whether or not EMC
and CVWC currently have any disagreements regarding these conditions is immaterial. It is
sufficient for purposes of this motion that CVWC has the apparent ability to force EMC to forego

its ability to independently control its litigation in the event a disagreement arises in the future.
The Court :finds the Agreements transfer a substantial degree of control over litigation decisions

from EMC to CVWC in the EMC) malpractice claim.
Assignment of Property Interest
The Agreements also grant CVWC a property interest in EMC's claim. The Agreements
go beyond providing security for payment of the Settlement amount .in the underlying case.
Instead of granting a security interest for a sum ce1tain, the Agreements grant an uncertain

amount, based on a percentage of the total amow1t of recovery. The Agreements grants CVWC
an interest in EMC's property rights. It also grants CVWC a pecuniary incentive to maximize the
amount of recovery by EMC.
The Settlement Agreement and Contingency Fee Agreement do not expressly assign the
malpractice claim to CVWC. However, "the creation and existence of an assigmnent is to be

determined according to the intention of the parties, which is to be discerned not only from the
instruments executed by them, if an, but from tbe surrounding circumstances." 6A C.J.S.
Assignments §57 (20 J0). From the Agreements, and the apparent intent of the pariies the court
finds that the Agreements constitute a partial assignment of EM C's malpractice claims.
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Docs the Partial Assignment of Property Interests in and Partial Control of a
Malpractice Claim Bar EMC from Pursuing the Claim?
PKH argues that the public policies that would prohibit an assignment of EMCs
malpractice claim should also apply to tJ1is partial assignment. Whether assigning all or a part of
a malpractice claim violates a public policy and bars the assignor from pursuing its claim is a
matter of first impression in Utah. Neither of the parties were able to find a controlling Utah case
on this point. Although P~H asks the court to rely on the 1999 Utah Supreme Court case of

Snow v Tanasse, 1999 UT 49 for suppo11 the Court finds that case is not helpful. SnoH' sheds no
light on the question of partial assignments, and expressly declines to address the question of
whether malpractice claims are assignable in Utah. When the same case was previously before

the Court of Appeals as Tanasse v Snow, the Court laid out the majority and minority positions
on the issue of whether a malpractice claim is vohmtarily assignable, but the Appellate Court
also expressly passed on deciding that issue for Utah. Where there is no controlling precedent,
both parties have relied on the persuasiveness ofcases from other states.
Majority Position:

According to Snow v Tanasse, and Gurski v Rosenblum & Filian, 885 A.2d 163, states
that have adopted the position that legal malpmctice claims are personal and can not be assigned
include: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, lllinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan,

Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevv Jersey, Nevada Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia. These
states identify many overlapping public policy considerations including the unique and personal
nature of the relationshjp between attorney and client, the need to preserve the sanctity of that
relationship, confidentiality, and conflicts of interests among others, to support their adoption of
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this majority position.
Minoritv Position:
According to Snow v Tanasse, states that adopted the position that legal malpractice
claims are assignable include New York, Oregon and Pennsylvania. These states generally hold
that legal malpractice claims are based on routine negligence or contract theories and should be
assignable as are any routine tort or contract claim.
Neither party argued that this Court should adopt the minority position. Because of the
public policy issues supporting the non-assignability of legal malpractice claims, this court
adopts the majority position.

Public Policy Issues:
The court considered the following public policy concerns and rulings by courts in other
states regarding assignability of legal malpractice claims:

Exploitation and merchandising of malpractice claims. "It is the unique quality
of legal services, the personal nature of the attorney's duty to the client and the
confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship that invoke public policy
considerations in our conclusion that malpractice claims should not be subject to
assignment. The assignment of such claims could relegate the legal malpractice
action to the market place and convert it to a commodity to be exploited and
transferred to economic bidders who have never had a professional relationship
with the attorney and to whom the attorney has never owed a legal duty, and who
have never had any prior connection with the assignor or his rights. The
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commercial aspect of assignability of choses in action arising oul of legal
malpractice is rife with probabilities that could only debase the legal profession,"

(See, Goodley v Wank & Wank, 62 Cal. App. Jd 389)
Preservation of the S;mctity of the client-lawyer relationship. "The assig11ment
of a legal malpractice claim is perhaps most incompatible with the attorney's duty
of loyalty. An attorney's loyalty is likely to be weakened by the knowledge that a
client can sell off a malpractice claim, particularly if an adversary can buy it. If an
attorney is providing zealous representation to a client, the client's adversary will
likely be motivated to strike back at the attorney in any permissible fashion. If an
adversary can retaliate by buying up a client's malpractice action, attorneys will
begin to rethink the wisdom of zealous advocacy. A legal system that discourages
loyalty to the client, disserves that client." "Unlike any other commercial
transaction, the client-lawyer relationship is structured to function within an
adversarial legal system. In order to operate within this system, the relationship
must do more than bind together a client and a lawyer. 1t must also work to repel
attacks from legal adversaries. TI10se who are not privy to the relationship are
often purposefully excll1ded because they are pursujng interests adverse to the
client's interests." (See, Picadilly, inc. v Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338) For example,
EMC's relationship with PKH was maintained for one purpose, to defeat
CVWC's suit against EMC CVWC was the antagonist who by initialing its
lawsuit against EMC drove EMC to seek out the protection offered by the
client-lawyer relationship with PKH.
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Opportunity for Collusion. One compelling argument against assignment is that
"[p]ermitting an assignment of a legal malpractice claim to the adversary in the
underlying litigation that gave rise to the legal malpractice claim ... creates the
opportunity and incentive for collusion in stipulating to damages in exchange for
an agreement not to execute on the judgment in the underlying litigation. it (See,

Gurski, 885 A.2d at 174). Nothing prevents the parties from stipulating to
artificially inflated damages that could serve as the basis for unjustly high
damages in the 'trial within a trial' phase of the subsequent malpractice action.
While it is not necessary to find that the consent judgment in the underlying
litigation was the product of collusion or that the stipulated damages were
unreasonable, the Cou1t "merely observes that the opportunity and incentive for
collusion were certainly present." (.'Jee, Kommavongsa v. Haskeli, 67 P.3d at.
l 077).
An abrupt and shameless shift of positions in the malpractice case. "The trial
of this assigned malpractice claim would feature a public and disreputable role
reversal. The mechanics of trying this case would magnify the least attractive
aspects of the legal system . . .. Because of the unique nature of the trial within a
trial [the] change in position would be obvious to all the jmors hearing the
evidence.... They would rightly leave the courtroom with less regard for the law

a11d the legal profession than they had when they entered." Picadilly, Inc. v.
Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338.

No distinction between as assignment of ll cause of action ancl an assignment
Page 14

002639

of recovery. Courts have found a "meaningless distinction" between an

assignment of a cause of action and an assignment of recovery from such an
action, which distinction is made merely to circumvent the public policy barring
assignments (See, Town & Courwy Bank v Country Mutual Ins., 121 Ill. App. 3d
216 and Gurski v Rosenblum & Filian, 885 A.2d 163).
The court recognizes that each of these are important public concerns that oppose the
assignability of malpractice claims. These public policy concerns, combined with the parties
failure to present suppo1i for the minority position, are sufficient to persuade the Court to adopt
the majority position that malpractice claims should not be assignable. The Court also agrees
with the reasoning of the Court in Town & Country that" ... the distinction between the
assignment of a cause of action for personal injuries and the assignment of the expectancy of

recovery from such an action [is] a fiction not necessary to support some public policy ... and
[the Court] will not adopt this meaningless distinction to circumvent that public policy. If the
assigm11ent of the cause of action is void, the assignment of the expectancy of the proceeds is
also void."
Although there is no express assignment of the claim in this case, it is obvious that the
Agreements transfer to CYWC a substantial level of EMC control over the litigation decisioris
and a substantial portion of EMC's property rights. Although the Contingenc.y Fee Agreement
was drafted to state, "the parties agree," the Contingency Fee Agreement and the Settlement
Agreement are merged, establishing the potential that a violation of the Contingency Fee
Agreement's terms may result in consequences to EMC's benefits under the Settlement
Agreement.
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Based on the assignment of substantial control over litigation decisions and

m1

interest in

the potential proceeds of the cunent litigation the court finds the Agreements violate public
policy.

EMC May Pursue its Claims Under Certain Conditions.
Nothing in this or<;ler prohibits EMC from pursuing its claims against PKH for
malpractice. However, EMC may not do so under the restrictions placed on it by the Agreements.
Similar to the decision in Davis v Scott, 320 S.W. 3d 87, the Court finds that EMC "has not
forfeited its claim, but [the Court] can not ignore the fact that the present suit is born of the ...
assigmuent and is, therefore, tainted in some respect." EMC is permitted to pursue its claim
against PKH if it satisfies the Court that it will be prosecuted independently of the settlement
agreement. To do so, at a minimum, EMC needs to establish that its litigation is not controlled in
any way by CVWC, and that EMC is not represented by attorneys associated \vlth CVWC.

ORDER
EM C's complaint against PKH is dismissed without prejudice. EMC may re-file its
claims against PKH if it establishes that it is not controlled in any way by CVWC and is not
represented by attorneys associated with CVWC.
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